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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Small businesses and the entrepreneurial spirit are among the driving forces in economic growth 
and development in the United States. The US governments (both federal and state) have long 
been aware of the importance of entrepreneurship, and many policies are directed toward helping 
small businesses. However, whether such policies give rise to expected behavioral responses 
from small businesses remains inconclusive. This dissertation looks into the behavioral response 
of self-employed filers to individual income tax and the impact of state and federal tax policies 
on entrepreneurship. In the first chapter, we examine taxpayers’ behavioral response to the 
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). We find strong evidence that taxpayers, especially self-
employed individuals, appear to manipulate their incomes to avoid the AMT. We also find 
suggestive evidence that the notch created by the AMT generates both a real response and an 
evasion response. These results have important policy implications for the AMT design and for 
the evaluation of the welfare loss from taxation of small businesses. The second chapter 
examines the effect of state tax policies on entrepreneurial activity. This paper contributes to the 
literature in several important ways: first, we explore dynamic specifications to capture inherent 
time trends among entrepreneurial performance. Second, we consider a number of intensive-
margin measures of state nonfarm proprietors’ success.  Our paper is the first to use nonfarm 
proprietors’ income as a direct measure of entrepreneurial success at the state level. We 
investigate several measures of small business performance derived from nonfarm proprietors’ 
income and employment data. Third, we extend the earlier research by including a longer panel 
(1978-2009) of state data.  Despite these innovations, our empirical results echo the recent 
studies in this area and suggest that most of the highly-visible state tax policies do not have 
statistically significant impacts on entrepreneurial performance. The last chapter uses time series 
analysis to explore the effect of federal tax policies on entrepreneurial performance and whether 
the effect is heterogeneous across different stages of the business cycle. We do not find that tax 
policy affects the small businesses sector differently between economic ups and downs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Entrepreneurship has been a primary driving force behind economic growth. Given the 
importance of entrepreneurship, the federal and state governments have a long history of using 
tax policy to promote entrepreneurship as part of a broader economic development mission. 
However, the past literature found mixed results on the effect of tax policy on entrepreneurship.  
 
This dissertation examines the effects of federal and state tax policies on various 
measures of entrepreneurship. The first chapter looks into taxpayers’ behavioral responses to the 
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). We find convincing evidence that taxpayers, especially self-
employed individuals, appear to manipulate their incomes to avoid the AMT. We also find 
suggestive evidence that the notch created by the AMT generates both a real response and an 
evasion response. The self-employed act more aggressively than wage earners to avoid the AMT.   
 
The second chapter examines the effect of state tax policy on entrepreneurial 
performance. We consider a number of intensive-margin measures of state nonfarm proprietors’ 
success.  Our paper is the first to use nonfarm proprietors’ income as a direct measure of 
entrepreneurial success at the state level. Additionally, we explore dynamic specifications 
(Arellano-Bond Estimation) to capture the inherent time trends of entrepreneurial performance. 
We find that state tax policies do not have much impact on entrepreneurial success. 
 
The third chapter uses time series analysis to explore the effect of federal tax policy on 
entrepreneurial performance and examines whether or not this effect is heterogeneous across 
different stages of the business cycle. Following chapter 2, it also uses nonfarm proprietors’ 
income and a series of income-based measures to directly measure entrepreneurship. The 
standard time series analysis (Ordinary Least Squares Regression) shows federal tax policies 
have statistically significant but economically small effects on the level of entrepreneurship. 
Further Vector Error Correction Models (VECM) reveal that the changes in tax rates also affect 
the changes in entrepreneurship.  
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Taken together, the results indicate that at the individual level, federal tax policy can generate 
large incentives for taxpayers to change their behavior, especially for the self-employed. Most of 
the behavior change comes from tax-based misreporting. At an aggregate level, the effect of 
federal tax policy on entrepreneurship is very limited. State tax policies do not have significant 
effect on entrepreneurial success.  
 
 This dissertation makes several important contributions to the literature and has important 
policy implications. Most of the prior studies have focused on extensive-margin of 
entrepreneurial activity, such as the entry and exit of small businesses. The extensive margin is 
important, but entrepreneurial performance on the intensive margin may be more relevant to 
policy than extensive-margin counts of entrepreneurs or small businesses. It is the enduring small 
and innovative firms that create a steady stream of jobs and generate economic spillovers over a 
longer period of time. We use a comprehensive set of measures to capture the intensive margin 
of small businesses, and we find tax policy has very limited effect on the intensive margin. It 
suggests that even though a pro-small-business tax policy may create more entrepreneurs, it does 
not help improving the performance of entrepreneurship.  
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CHAPTER I 
TAX EVASION AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN THE US: A LOOK AT 
THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX 
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Abstract  
  
Originally designed to target high-income households, the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) for 
individuals is a separate income tax system that operates in parallel to the regular income tax. 
Using Individual Public Use Tax Files for 1994-2002, this paper is the first to look into 
individuals’ income-reporting behavior in response to the AMT. We find strong evidence that 
taxpayers, especially self-employed individuals, appear to manipulate their incomes to avoid the 
AMT. We also find suggestive evidence that the notch created by the AMT generates both a real 
response and an evasion response. The self-employed act more aggressively than wage earners to 
avoid the AMT. Specifically, we find evidence suggesting that the self-employed are likely to 
increase the ratio of certain tax deductible consumption to their income as they approach the 
AMT threshold. This is suggestive evidence that they underreport their taxable income as they 
move closer to the AMT threshold. We also find the Schedule C filers may increase their 
business expenses in order to avoid the AMT. These results have important policy implications 
for the AMT design and for the evaluation of the welfare loss from taxation of small businesses. 
 
Keywords: Alternative minimum tax; Self-employed; Tax evasion; Labor response 
JEL Classification Numbers: H2, H24, H26 
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I. Introduction 
The alternative minimum tax (AMT) for individuals is a separate system of income taxation that 
operates in parallel to the regular income tax. Taxpayers who may be affected by the AMT must 
recalculate their taxes using rules about income and deductions different from those that apply to 
regular income tax. If they owe more under the AMT than they would under regular income tax, 
they pay the AMT amount. In other words, the AMT can be viewed as an additional tax levied 
on taxpayers whose regular tax is found to be too low relative to their income. 
 
Although Congress originally enacted the AMT to ensure that high income individuals 
pay at least a minimum amount of tax each year, it now affects more tax filers in the middle 
income classes. One reason for the expansion of AMT is that unlike the regular tax system, the 
AMT tax brackets are not indexed for inflation. In addition, the tax cuts passed during the early 
2000s exacerbate the AMT problem because they reduce regular income taxes without a 
corresponding permanent reduction in the AMT (Lim et. al., 2009). The tax cuts and lack of 
indexation combine to push millions of taxpayers onto the AMT. A total of 27 percent of 
households that paid the AMT in 2008 had adjusted gross income of $200,000 or less (Bryan, 
2009). 
 
Every year taxpayers need to consider if they need to pay the AMT. The IRS web site 
provides the AMT assistant to help taxpayers determine whether they may be subject to the 
AMT. If the results show someone might owe the AMT, he may need to complete Form 6251 to 
find out if he owes the AMT and how much he owes. And if this person triggers the AMT, his 
average tax rate might go up, sometimes substantially. The AMT system brings additional 
administrative burden to taxpayers.  
 
This paper exploits the parallel structure of the regular income tax and the AMT to 
investigate a series of questions: First, do households manipulate their incomes in order to avoid 
the AMT as they move toward the AMT threshold? If bunching is found, is there any difference 
between self-employed individuals and wage earners? More importantly, does the behavioral 
response come from misreporting or real activity change? 
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Studying the effect of taxes on economic behavior is important. First, the behavioral 
response of taxpayers affects the tax revenue. Second, it affects economic efficiency or 
deadweight loss (Feldstein, 2008). This paper follows in the spirit of Saez (2010), who examined 
bunching of kink points created by the EITC. It is the first to study potential bunching behavior 
created by the AMT at the top end of the income distribution, and whether such bunching 
behavior is driven by misreporting or real activity change. The results have important policy 
implications. If a behavioral response is found and it is mainly driven by misreporting, the 
welfare loss are the tax revenue loss and the costs of tax planning. However, if the response is 
driven by both misreporting and real activity change, the total deadweight loss is substantially 
greater than under the first assumption. Additional deadweight loss occurs because households 
adjusted their labor supply or other activities to avoid higher tax. The deadweight loss from both 
misreporting and real activity change is larger than that from misreporting only. 
 
To analyze how households respond to the AMT, we use the IRS Individual Public Use 
Tax Files for 1994–2002. These files contain the information directly from a large sample of 
individual tax returns. We limit our analysis to those who filed Form 6251 and calculate each 
person’s gap between the regular income tax and the AMT, which we call the AMT gap. Then 
we plot histograms of the AMT gap and find evidence that suggests that taxpayers manipulate 
their income just below the AMT threshold. A formal test (McCrary, 2008) provides evidence 
that bunching exists. We further explore the difference between self-employed individuals and 
wage earners. We find the bunching created by self-employed individuals locates further away 
from the AMT threshold than the bunching created by wage earners, which suggests that the self-
employed act more aggressively to avoid the AMT. To explore potential causes of the bunching, 
we use a consumption-based method (Pissarides and Weber, 1989) to estimate whether the 
bunching is created by misreporting or real activity response. We find suggestive evidence of 
both a real response and misreporting. 
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II. Literature Review 
Some of the most related studies on the self-employed’s behavioral response to the US income 
tax schedule focuses on the lower end of income distribution. Using tax return data, Saez (2010) 
found clear evidence of bunching at the first kink created by the EITC, and the bunching was 
solely concentrated among self-employed taxpayers. However, it was unclear whether the 
bunching represents changes in real labor supply or misreporting. Kuka (2013) took advantage of 
a natural experiment (1993 EITC expansion) to exploit the mechanism underlying the different 
bunching behaviors. He assumed people truthfully revealed their income in survey data, and 
compared estimates of labor supply effects from survey data (the March Current Population 
Survey) and the Public Use Tax File data. He concluded that the bunching behavior found in 
Saez (2010) was mainly driven by tax noncompliance (i.e. tax evasion).  
 
Some related studies looked at behavioral responses to government programs. Ramnath 
(2013) used Public Use Tax Files to test whether taxpayers bunch their income at the notch 
created by the Saver’s Credit. She found strong evidence that bunching occurs in response to the 
credit. In addition, she found that the credit failed to increase savings among low and middle 
income taxpayers. Some studies examined behavioral responses to foreign tax regimes. Chetty 
et. al. (2009) used tax return data from Denmark and found that bunching occurred when the top 
rate started to apply. However, they did not find much evidence of bunching at lower kink 
points. Kleven and Waseem (2011) used tax return data in Pakistan to find bunching behavior at 
different notch points. They found larger and sharp bunching for the self-employed alongside 
much smaller bunching among wage earners. They attributed the bunching for wage earners to 
real labor responses. The sharper bunching for the self-employed was created by tax evasion in 
addition to real labor responses. 
 
To our knowledge, no study has examined the behavioral response to the AMT. This 
study is among the first to explore the bunching behavior when taxpayers approach the AMT 
threshold.  
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III. Data and Evidence of Behavioral Response to the AMT 
Compared to the regular income tax, the AMT defines income differently, imposes different tax 
rates and allows different deductions, exemptions and credits (Lim et. al., 2009). Whether a 
taxpayer is subject to the AMT depends on various aspects of his tax return, such as the number 
of dependents, state tax level, and filing status. In general, the AMT imposes a higher rate of tax 
on the marginal income than the regular tax does. Since there is no third party reporting, self-
employed taxpayers have more opportunity to move their incomes below the level where they 
might trigger the AMT. The resulting discontinuity in an individual/household's tax liability 
fosters a strong incentive to forgo that extra dollar of income, either by altering real activity or by 
misreporting income. Unlike nonlinearities brought by the tax brackets in the regular tax system, 
the jump from the regular tax to the AMT gives taxpayers a stronger reason to manipulate their 
income and tax deductions. 
 
This paper uses the Individual Public Use Tax Files for 1994-2002. We concatenate 
yearly data into one pooled cross-sectional dataset. The Public Use Tax Files are an annual cross-
section of tax returns available since 1960. The files are rich in income information drawn 
directly from tax returns. Since the AMT is set to target high income taxpayers, the fact that the 
Public Use Tax Files over-sample wealthy individuals or individuals with business income 
makes it a good dataset to study the bunching behaviors (Ramnath, 2013), especially the 
behaviors of self-employed individuals near the AMT threshold. 
 
If a taxpayer is likely to owe the AMT, he is likely to work through tax Form 6251 to 
determine if he actually owes the AMT and how much he owes. We limit our sample to those 
who filed Form 6251, which yields a sample size of 120,488 returns. Those taxpayers who work 
through Form 6251 are arguably more informed about the AMT structure than those who do not 
file the form, and they are more likely to manipulate their incomes to avoid the AMT liabilities. 
In addition, these people are most likely at the margin of filing the AMT.  Therefore, what we 
estimated can be interpreted as an upper bound of the behavioral response to the AMT. In 
addition, the results presented here are all suggestive evidence because the data are pooled cross-
section. 
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Previous studies have used histograms of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) to find kink or 
notch points. Saez (2010) plotted histograms of the distribution of AGI with small bins and 
checked whether spikes appeared at kink points brought by the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC). Ramnath (2013) used normalized AGI1 to produce the histogram and found the notch 
point in response to the Saver's Credit. Unlike prior studies, one of the challenges of detecting 
bunching behaviors brought by the AMT is that there is no clear population cutoff to trigger the 
AMT. Unlike EITC and Saver's Credit, every taxpayer's AMT liability is different even with the 
same amount of AGI. One's AMT liability depends not only on his AGI, but also on his filing 
status, state and local taxes, and number of personal exemptions, etc. The complicated tax 
structure makes it impossible to find the bunching just by plotting the AGI distribution. 
 
To detect any discontinuity in the AMT, this paper creatively plots histograms and 
density distributions using an AMT gap concept. We define the AMT gap as the difference 
between the AMT liability and the regular tax liability. First, we calculated each person’s AMT 
liability based on his tax return information on Form 1040 and Form 6251. Then we subtracted 
his regular tax liability from his projected AMT liability to calculate the gap. The AMT gap is 
positive if one's AMT exceeds his regular tax. Because bunching is most likely to be observed at 
the margin, we drop the taxpayers whose tax gaps are extremely high or extremely low. Our 
sample is limited to those within $30,000 of their individual-specific AMT thresholds. 
 
Since the AMT's rules are known ahead of time and tax returns for the self-employed are 
not based on third-party reporting, taxpayers (especially the self-employed) may bunch their 
AGIs just below the threshold where the AMT will take effect. If there is a bunching in the AGI 
distribution, there will be a corresponding bunching in the tax liability distribution. Figure A.1 
shows the kernel density estimate of the AMT gap for 1994-2002 as the solid line.2 The graph 
overlays a histogram of the actual data. 
 
There are three interesting results in the graph. First, we observe taxpayers bunching just 
below the threshold at which the AMT exceeds the regular income tax. In addition, there is a 
                                            
1 She multiplies single filers’ AGI by 2, and head of household’s’ AGI by 4/3. 
2 We use the Epanechnikov kernel. 
10 
 
sharp notch around -$3,600. There also appears to be a dip in the distribution around -$1,200. 
Although the kernel density graph provides clear evidence of bunching, we perform a more 
formal test for a break in the density. McCrary (2008) developed a test for detecting 
manipulation of a running variable in the context of regression discontinuity (RD) estimation. A 
running variable is what a policy is based on. In this paper, whether a person should pay the 
AMT depends on his AMT gap. In our case, the AMT gap is the running variable. Assuming the 
distribution of the AMT gap would be continuous in the absence of the AMT, a break in the 
estimated density would indicate manipulation of the running variable. In a RD design, bunching 
in the running variable has the potential to be problematic (Ramnath 2013). But in this paper, 
bunching serves as evidence of a behavioral response to the policy. 
 
The McCrary Test first creates an under-smoothed histogram where no one bin contains 
points both to the left and to the right of the break. Then it uses local linear regression to smooth 
the histogram and provide an estimate of the density of the AMT gap. These two steps provide 
visual evidence for whether a break exists in the data. Following McCrary (2008) and Ramnath 
(2013), the test statistic for estimating the break is derived by taking the log differences in 
distribution of the AMT gap variable at the notch, given by θ� = lnf̂+ − lnf̂−. lnf̂+ is the log of 
the distribution of the AMT gap on the right of the break. lnf̂− is the log of the distribution of the 
AMT gap on the left of the break. The statistic θ� measures the difference in the density at the 
notch between left hand side and right hand side. The null hypothesis is that θ�  is zero at the 
notch, which indicates no bunching occurred. Figures A.2–A.4 show graphical results of the test. 
Table A.1 gives the numeric results from the break tests and indicates all three breaks (-$3,600, -
$1,200 and $0) are significant in the distribution of the tax gap variable. 
 
The main finding from the density graph is that there is a small bunching around the 
AMT threshold and a sharp bunching around -$3,600 combined with a drop in the density around 
-$1,200. This provides clear evidence of a response to the tax structure. In addition, the McCrary 
tests show that the density is always higher at the side that is further away from the AMT 
triggering point, which indicates that taxpayers try to manipulate their income to avoid the AMT.  
 
11 
 
Given that bunching does exist in the data, we next explore the difference between the 
self-employed individuals and the wage earners. For the purpose of this paper, we have a broad 
definition of self-employment. A person is treated as self-employed if any of his income/losses 
comes from schedule C, schedule E or schedule F. A wage earner is one who has no schedule C, 
E or F income. Detailed summary statistics of these two groups are presented in Table A.2. The 
self-employed have higher medians of AGI, the AMT liability and the regular tax liability. 
However, there is a lower percentage of the self-employed paying the AMT (23 percent) than 
that of wage earners (27 percent)  
 
Figure A.5 presents a histogram of all self-employed individuals overlayed by a 
histogram of all wage earners in 1994-2002. We notice two main differences between self-
employed individuals and wage earners. The mass of the distribution of self-employed 
individuals is to the left of zero (the regular tax side). It suggests that the self-employed act more 
aggressively to avoid the AMT. We observe that wage earners also manipulate their income 
around zero, which suggests possible changes in real activity.  
 
We further explore two narrower definitions of self-employment: taxpayers with at least 
10 percent of their income/losses from Schedule C, E or F and those with at least 20 percent of 
their income/loss from Schedule C, E or F. Figure A.6 presents a histogram of the self-employed 
with at least 10 percent of their income from Schedule C, E or F, overlayed by a histogram of the 
rest of the sample. We observe the similar result that the self-employed appear to act more 
aggressively to avoid the AMT. Next we define self-employment as having at least 20 percent of 
one’s income from Schedule C, E or F. The overlayed histograms (Figure A.7) show the same 
conclusion as Figures A.5 and A.6.  
 
Next we look into comparisons of separate schedule filers (Figures A.8 – A.10). The 
results are similar to previous figures. More mass of the distributions of Schedule C filers, 
Schedule E filers, and Schedule F filers are located to the left of zero. All three groups have 
sharper notches than those in the comparison group. 
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There are several explanations to the different behavioral responses between wage 
earners and the self-employed. On the intensive margin, the self-employed have greater 
flexibility to choose hours of work and intensity of work. On the extensive margin, they have 
larger labor supply flexibility (choose whether to work or not) than wage earners. In addition, 
wage earners and the self-employed might have different tax noncompliance behavior. Earnings 
from self-employment are easier to underreport to the tax authority (Kuka, 2013). Therefore the 
self-employed can take more aggressive actions to avoid the AMT. For example, the Schedule C 
filers can reduce their tax liabilities by overreporting business expenses. Since wage income is 
third-party reported and therefore difficult to underreport without being detected (Kleven and 
Waseem, 2011), the bunching in the distribution of wage income may be attributed to real 
response. However, wage earners could manipulate some of their itemized deductions, so the 
bunching could also mean some misreporting. We turn to this next. 
IV. Misreporting or Real Activity Response? 
Given that we have found clear evidence of bunching, the next question is whether it is driven by 
misreporting or real responses. Pissarides and Weber (1989) pioneered an expenditure-based 
approach to estimating taxpayer compliance. They estimated food expenditure equations 
conditional on household characteristics and reported income. The idea is assuming that self-
employed households have the same preferences regarding food as wage earners and wage 
earners truthfully reveal their income, differences by employment status in the estimated 
relationship between reported income and food expenditures may be attributed to underreporting 
of income by the self-employed. One key assumption of the PW method is that the reporting of 
expenditure on some items by all groups is accurate. 
 
Since food consumption information is not available in the tax return data, we creatively 
look at certain itemized deductions on the Schedule A and treat them as “tax-based 
consumption” items. Interest paid is one example, and it mainly includes two parts: home 
mortgage interest paid and investment interest paid. Since both of them are subject to third-party 
reporting, it is perhaps safe to assume that taxpayers truthfully reveal their consumption on these 
items. Another consumption item we look at is property tax paid. The analogy of using property 
tax is similar to the use of interest paid. We also consider charitable donations as one of the 
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consumption items (Feldman and Slemrod, 2007). However, it should be pointed out that 
charitable donations can be easily manipulated or misreported by taxpayers. We consider all 
three ratios of tax-based consumption to total income (interest paid ratio, property tax ratio and 
charitable donations ratio). The estimated equation is as follows: 
 ln � Ci,jTotal Income� = β1 ∗ AMT Gapi,j + β2 ∗ Self Employedi,j + β3 ∗ AMT Payersi,j   +[β4 ∗ AMT Gapi,j ∗ Self Employedi,j] + [β5 ∗ Self Employedi,j ∗ AMT Payersi,j]                             +[β6 ∗ AMT Gapi,j ∗ AMT Payersi,j] +[β7 ∗ AMT Gapi,j ∗ Self Employedi,j ∗ AMT Payersi,j] + γi,j ∗ Zi,j + Yearj + εi,j 
 
We use log-level regression to capture the nonlinearity between the AMT gap and the 
ratios of tax-based consumption to total income. Ci,j represents one of the three tax-based 
consumption items. As defined in the previous section, AMT Gapi,j is the difference between a 
person’s AMT and regular tax. 3  
 
The main interest of this equation is  β1, which captures the relationship between tax-
based consumption ratios and the AMT gap. Since it might change once taxpayers cross the 
AMT threshold, we include a dummy AMT Payersi,j which equals one if a person’s projected 
AMT is greater than the regular tax. We also use their interaction term [AMT Gapi,j ∗AMT Payersi,j] to allow the effects of the AMT gap to differ between the two sides of the AMT 
threshold. 
 
To account for the different responses to the AMT gap between the self-employed and 
wage earners, we include a dummy Self Employedi,j which equals one if a person has any 
income/loss from Schedule C, E or F. In addition, we use the interaction term [AMT Gapi,j ∗Self Employedi,j], which allows the AMT gap to affect consumption ratios differently between 
the self-employed and wage earners. We use a three-way interaction term [AMT Gapi,j ∗
                                            
3 If 𝐴𝑀𝑇 𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖 ,𝑗 is negative, a higher value indicates that a person moves closer to the AMT threshold. If 
𝐴𝑀𝑇 𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖 ,𝑗 is positive, a higher value indicates that a person moves away from the AMT threshold. 
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Self Employedi,j ∗ AMT Payersi,j] to capture the effect of AMT gap when a taxpayer is self-
employed and pays the AMT.  Zi,j represents a series of economic controls, and Yearj is a series 
of dummies representing the filing year.  ϵi,j is the error term.  
 
Following a similar strategy to the PW method, we test the following assumption. 
Consumption on housing is considered a fairly stable portion of one’s income. It is unlikely 
someone would change his housing consumption according to his tax schedule on a yearly basis. 
A change in housing consumption should be a good indicator that there is a real activity 
change/labor supply change in this household. Recall that we define the dependent variables as 
the ratio of one’s tax-based consumption (i.e., consumption on housing or charitable donations) 
to his total income. If there is no misreporting (i.e., only change in real activity), the ratio should 
exhibit a stable pattern as individuals get closer to the AMT threshold, all else equal. However, if 
we observe the ratio changes as one moves closer to the AMT threshold, we can point that as 
suggestive evidence that taxpayers manipulate their income according to the tax schedule. The 
results are presented in Table A.3.  
 
The AMT gap measures the individual specific distance to the point of triggering the 
AMT. Results show that we reject the null hypothesis that there is no misreporting. As taxpayers 
move closer to the AMT triggering point, all three ratios of their consumption to income 
increase. Specifically, when the AMT gap increases by $1,000, the ratio of interest paid to one’s 
income increases approximately by 0.01 percent. The ratio of his property tax paid to total 
income increases by 0.02 percent and the ratio of his charitable donation to total income 
increases by 0.01 percent. Once they pass the AMT threshold, the ratio of interest paid to one’s 
total income decreases as they move away from the threshold. These provide suggestive 
evidence that taxpayers underreport their taxable income to avoid the AMT, especially when 
they are about to trigger the AMT.  
 
 The self-employed start at a higher level of consumption ratio. Their ratio of interest paid 
to total income is 0.05 percent higher than the wage earners’. The ratio of charitable donations to 
total income is 0.26 percent higher than the wage earners’. According to the PW theory, if one’s 
source of income is unrelated to his expenditure, any difference in the relationship between the 
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expenditure ratio and the source of income can be attributed to (relative) underreporting by the 
individual. Our results are suggestive evidence that the self-employed relatively underreport 
more income or overreport more consumption, compared to wage earners. This is consistent with 
the findings by previous studies that the self-employed are likely to misreport (Feldman and 
Slemrod, 2007; Kleven and Waseem, 2011). However, it should be pointed out that it is possible 
that the self-employed have different preferences over these tax consumptions from the wage 
earners. For instance, some self-employed people may work at home and therefore prefer to 
invest more in the house for a larger work space. 
 
We use case studies to better illustrate the difference between the self-employed and 
wage earners’ behaviors. The first case is a wage earner with a 20 percent interest paid ratio and 
an AMT gap of -$10,000, which means he is $10,000 away from the AMT triggering point. 
When he moves from -$10,000 to the AMT threshold ($0), his interest paid ratio increases from 
20 percent to 20.1 percent. Once he triggers the AMT, his interest paid ratio begins to decrease. 
If he moves from the AMT threshold ($0) to $10,000, his ratio will decrease from 20.1 percent to 
18.4 percent. The second case is a self-employed taxpayer. All else equal, the self-employed who 
locates at -$10,000 has a slightly higher interest paid ratio (20.054 percent). As he moves from -
$10,000 to the AMT threshold, his ratio increases from 20.054 percent to 20.114 percent. Similar 
to wage earner, his ratio also begins to decrease after he crosses the trigger point. By calculation, 
his interest ratio is 18.69 percent when he pays $10,000 of AMT.  
 
To sum up, the self-employed have higher levels of tax-based consumption ratios, but 
they do not change these ratios as aggressively as is shown in the previous histograms. We 
attribute this to the following possibilities. Being self-employed gives taxpayers more evasion 
opportunities. For instance, the taxpayers who file Schedule C could either over-report business 
expenses or underreport business income on Schedule C. If that is the case, they do not need to 
aggressively move these three tax-based consumption ratios. To check our hypothesis, we run 
the regression on Schedule C filers only (Table A.4). The results show that Schedule C filers do 
increase the ratio of business expense to business income (i.e. gross income on Schedule C) 
when they move toward the AMT threshold. When they move $1,000 closer to the AMT 
threshold, their business expense ratios increase by 0.02 percent. This suggests that Schedule C 
16 
 
filers try to avoid the AMT either by over-reporting business expenses or by underreporting 
business income. Once they pass the AMT threshold, there is no effect of further changes in the 
AMT gap on the business expenditure ratio. 
 
Other controls include the filers’ marginal tax rate, total number of exemptions, filing 
status, and age. Marginal tax rate is the effective federal marginal tax rate. In general, research 
finds that tax code creates incentives to consume more housing and to donate (Glaeser and 
Shapiro, 2003; Feldman and Slemrod, 2007). Contrary to previous literature, we find that a one-
percentage-point increase in the marginal tax rate leads to a decrease in the interest paid ratio of 
5.387 percent, a decrease in the property tax ratio of 3.725 percent and a decrease in the 
charitable donations ratio of 3.468 percent.  
 
 The coefficient on married and filing jointly taxpayers suggests that married couples have 
lower ratios of interest paid to their total income. Echoing Feldman and Slemrod (2007), we find 
evidence that married couples tend to give more than other households. Their ratio of charitable 
donations to total income is 0.116 percent higher than other filing groups.  
 
Our results show that more exemptions lead to higher ratios of all three expenditures to 
total income. The results are different from what Feldman and Slemrod (2007) have found. They 
found more exemptions are associated with lower levels of charitable donations. Taxpayers who 
are 65 years old and older tend to have a lower interest paid ratio, but a higher property tax ratio 
and a charitable donation ratio.    
 
 The main regression (Table A.3) uses a broad definition of self-employment. To check 
the robustness of our results, we run an additional regression with a narrower definition of self-
employment. We examine the self-employed with at least 20 percent of their income from 
Schedule C, E or F. It turns out that the results are robust (Table A.5). We observe the same 
pattern of changes in all three tax-based consumption ratios along the AMT gap.  
 
Since our sample is a pooled cross-section of data over several years, we run regressions 
for each year separately to check if the behavioral responses to the AMT are different across 
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years (Table A.6). Overall the results are robust. We find taxpayers change interest paid ratio as 
they move along the AMT gap in most years, except for Years 1994 and 1996. We attribute this 
to different environments for regular tax and AMT. For instance, in some years AMT parameters 
were not known until the end of the year. If that is the case, taxpayers can only avoid the 
AMT/reduce their tax liabilities by misreporting. In contrast, if a taxpayer knows the AMT 
parameters in advance, he might be able to adjust some of his household consumption or labor 
supply to avoid triggering the AMT. 
 
IV. Discussion and Conclusions 
The Alternative Minimum Tax is an important part of the US income tax system. It is an 
important revenue source for the federal government and affects millions of households every 
year. Using Public Use Files from 1994 to 2002, this paper presents for the first time evidence on 
behavioral responses to the AMT. We find clear and significant behavioral responses to the 
AMT threshold. The peculiar part of the AMT is that every taxpayer’s AMT liability is different. 
We add to the literature by using the AMT gap concept to plot the behavioral response to the 
AMT. Specifically, we project each taxpayer’s AMT liability based on their tax return and 
calculate the difference between their AMT liability and regular tax liability (i.e. the AMT gap). 
The AMT presents a large economic incentive to bunch and we find that individuals indeed 
respond. The evidence of bunching is strong, with a statistically significant break in the density 
of the AMT gap at the notch (as seen in the McCrary test). In addition, we explore the difference 
between the self-employed and wage earners, and find the self-employed act more aggressively 
to avoid the AMT. Wage earners also bunch their income around the AMT threshold, which 
suggests possible real activity change. Higher tax rates discourage people from earning income. 
 
We further investigate the question of whether such bunching behavior is caused by real 
responses or just misreporting in tax returns. Following the classic PW method, we take 
advantage of the relationship between tax-based consumption ratios and the distance to the AMT 
threshold. We find evidence that taxpayers might underreport their income as they move toward 
the AMT threshold. The self-employed have more opportunities than wage earners to avoid the 
AMT. Results from a restricted sample (Schedule C filers only) show that the Schedule C filers 
18 
 
are likely to either underreport their business income or over-report their business expenses to 
avoid the AMT.  
 
Overall, the findings suggest that the bunching created by the AMT comes from both real 
responses and misreporting. It has important policy implications. First, underreporting among the 
self-employed suggests revenue losses. Second, evidence suggests that the AMT has an impact 
on taxpayers’ real activity. This real response is what policy makers need to pay attention to. If 
people change their activities according the tax schedule, then there is economic distortion to the 
economy, in addition to tax revenue loss. Future work could continue to explore the causal 
impact of the AMT on taxpayer’s behavioral response if panel data becomes available.  
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CHAPTER II 
STATE TAX POLICY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
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Abstract 
The interplay between tax policy and entrepreneurial activity has been a popular topic of political 
discourse, especially among state-level policymakers, with the promotion of small business start-
ups and success being a key policy goal.  The effect of state policy on entrepreneurship has also 
been the focus in the most recent empirical economics literature.  We expand upon that literature 
in several important ways.  First, while most of the recent studies have relied upon conventional 
fixed effects regression models, we argue that such an approach misses the inherent trends in 
both tax policies and small business outcomes within states over time. We explore dynamic 
specifications to capture those trends.  Second, while most of the prior research has focused on 
extensive-margin indicators of small business activity (e.g., self-employment rates or counts of 
small businesses), we consider a number of intensive-margin measures of state nonfarm 
proprietors’ success.  This is based on our assumption that entrepreneurial sustainability and 
performance following the initial start-up are more important from a policy perspective than 
simple counts of small businesses. Our paper is the first to use nonfarm proprietors’ income as a 
direct measure of entrepreneurial success at the state level. We investigate several measures of 
small business performance derived from nonfarm proprietors’ income and employment data, 
including a measure of productivity (i.e. nonfarm proprietors’ income per employed person). 
Third, we extend the earlier research by including a longer panel (1978-2009) of state data.  
Despite these innovations, our empirical results echo the recent studies in this area and suggest 
that most of the highly-visible state tax policies do not have statistically significant impacts on 
entrepreneurial performance. 
 
Keywords: State tax policy; Small business; Entrepreneurship; Arellano-Bond Estimation 
JEL Classification Numbers: H2, H7, L26 
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I. Introduction 
Entrepreneurship has been a primary driving force behind employment creation, innovation, and 
economic growth. Innovative entrepreneurial activities not only generate income for successful 
firms and individuals, but can also create positive spillovers to state and local economies. State 
governments have a long history of using tax policy to promote entrepreneurship as part of a 
broader economic development mission. Until recently, most of these attempts have focused on 
cutting business taxes, such as the state corporate tax, in order to boost economic growth and job 
creation. Over the past several years, however, a growing number of elected officials and 
business organizations have called for cuts in state personal income taxes to benefit 
entrepreneurs who earn pass-through income (Mazerov, 2013). Recent tax policy debates in 
Kansas, Nebraska and Louisiana have touted a shift in tax policy away from income taxes and 
toward sales taxes, hoping such reforms would bring businesses and jobs to their states and lower 
the compliance costs associated with income taxes. The critical question that remains 
unanswered is whether such policy changes would give rise to the desired behavioral responses. 
Since entrepreneurship has such important effects on the economy, it is important to understand 
the influence of public policies such as personal and corporate income taxation on 
entrepreneurial activity.  Estimated parameters can be used to guide policy design if a non-zero 
effect can be determined. If the empirical evidence indicates that taxes have small or 
inconsequential effects on small businesses, then using tax policy to promote entrepreneurial 
activity would be unproductive.  
 
The impact of taxes on business activity has received considerable attention in the literature, 
but virtually all of the prior studies have focused on extensive-margin measures such as business 
locations, the number of small firm births, or variants of self-employment rates. Bartik (1985), 
for example, found that a ten percent increase in a state’s corporate income or property tax rate 
caused a one to three percent decline in the number of new plants. Wasylenko (1997) provided a 
review of the literature and concluded that taxes had statistically significant but quantitatively 
small effects on interregional location behavior with larger impacts at the intraregional level. 
Although these studies shed some light on the interaction between state tax policies and business 
decisions, they may be less relevant to entrepreneurial activity.  First, if smaller businesses are 
less mobile than larger firms (e.g. because of family ties or business linkages to local markets), 
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they are perhaps less likely to respond to state differences in tax policies. Further, most states 
have focused their tax incentive programs on larger manufacturing and headquarters firms rather 
than small businesses and entrepreneurs (Bruce and Deskins, 2012). 
 
Only a few studies have used state-level time series or panel data to investigate the impact 
of policy on small businesses, but most have found that state-level tax policies have significant 
effects on a variety of measures of entrepreneurial activity.  Bartik (1989) investigated detailed 
tax information and showed that higher property taxes, corporate taxes, and sales taxes on 
equipment negatively impacted small business start-ups. On the other hand, Carlton (1979) found 
no strong evidence that local taxes influenced the number of firm births. Georgellis and Wall 
(2002) used panel regression to examine the various determinants of state-level entrepreneurship.  
They found that bankruptcy exemptions, corporate tax rates, and the level of the minimum wage 
all affected a state’s rate of entrepreneurship.  Further, they found that the maximum marginal 
tax rate exerted a U-shaped effect on the number of nonfarm sole proprietors as a share of the 
working-age population. Bruce and Deskins (2012) used a 50-state panel from 1989 through 
2002 and found that higher top individual income tax rates, higher sales tax rates and the 
existence of a state-level estate, inheritance, or gift tax all tended to slightly reduce a state’s share 
of the national entrepreneurial stock as measured by the share of individuals reporting Schedule 
C income. 
 
These papers all provide important insights into the interaction between tax policies and 
entrepreneurship, and they present two important avenues for extension and potential 
improvement. First, most of the recent empirical research in this area has relied upon traditional 
fixed effects panel regression models. When considering entrepreneurial outcomes, it is 
important to account for the fact that outcomes in the previous periods could inherently affect 
outcomes in the current time period. This inertia in entrepreneurial activity, which we document 
in this paper, may result from such things as incomplete labor mobility (or other labor-market 
friction) or clientele loyalty.  In panel data settings, it is important to control for entrepreneurial 
performance in previous periods because small firms who are successful today are more likely to 
be successful in the future.  State-level observations are thus potentially correlated over time.   
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The consideration of the previous outcome as an explanatory variable raises the possibility 
of an endogeneity problem in a traditional panel regression. Fortunately, dynamic panel 
estimators are available to address this issue. We explore two different dynamic panel estimators 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). These are consistent and 
efficient estimators because instruments for endogenous explanatory variables are generated 
from variables already specified within the model. These specifications eliminate any 
unobservable time-invariant state effects and temporal effects that may systematically affect 
small businesses.  
 
Second, most of the prior studies have focused on extensive-margin measures of 
entrepreneurial activity, such as self-employment rates, counts of federal income tax returns with 
a Schedule C for small business income, or counts of small firms or establishments. One 
potential shortcoming of these measures is traditional measurement error.  Specifically, many 
self-employed individuals or Schedule C filers are not truly entrepreneurial, and many 
entrepreneurs do not classify themselves as self-employed or file a Schedule C (Bruce and 
Deskins, 2012). Moreover, the birth of a new firm or establishment does not necessarily signify 
an increase in entrepreneurial activity. These measures also do not capture potentially more 
important aspects of entrepreneurial performance, such as firm sustainability and growth. As is 
well known, small businesses start and fail at significantly high rates. An estimated 650,000 new 
employer-owned businesses were started and 565,000 went out of business in 2006 (Conte et al., 
2012). Similar small-firm birth and death rates are observed each year.  
 
The birth of a new small business is important, but state policy makers are probably more 
concerned with enduring small and innovative firms that create a steady stream of jobs and 
generate economic spillovers over a longer period of time.  Indeed, entrepreneurial performance 
on the intensive margin may be more relevant to state policy than extensive-margin counts of 
entrepreneurs or small businesses, especially given the relative short life-span of new small 
firms.  Kane (2010) shows, unsurprisingly, that small business survivors usually create more net 
jobs than start-ups.   
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To our knowledge, little research has been undertaken on the impact of taxes on levels of 
entrepreneurial income or entrepreneurial performance. We attempt to extend the prior literature 
by considering several alternative measures of entrepreneurial performance derived from 
reported nonfarm proprietors’ income (NFPI) at the state level.4  We also consider indicators of 
nonfarm proprietors’ employment (NFPE) in an effort to compare our results to the prior 
literature. Finally, we are the first in this literature to consider entrepreneurial productivity, 
which we measure by dividing NFPI by NFPE. 
 
In addition to these two main contributions, we expand the set of tax policy variables in our 
model and also extend the time period under investigation.  Specifically, we start with the 
specification used by Bruce and Deskins (2012), but we add an indicator for whether the state 
government offered a tax amnesty program in each year. Our state panel spans the years from 
1978 through 2009.  While the nonfarm proprietors’ income data are available as far back as 
1929, few of our desired covariates are available in a systematic fashion for all states prior to the 
1970s.   
 
To summarize our results, we find that state tax policies do not have quantitatively 
important effects on most of the entrepreneurial performance and productivity measures. The 
state tax policies are only statistically significant in static specifications that do not allow for past 
periods of performance to influence the present period, echoing much of the previous literature. 
In dynamic specifications that account for this trend in performance, the state tax policies do not 
have significant impacts. A step by step comparison with the prior literature shows that the main 
difference comes from the difference in estimation methods (i.e., using the Arellano-Bond 
estimator). Our results suggest that states that are interested in promoting entrepreneurial success 
should turn their focus away from ineffective tax policy options toward more general efforts to 
improve the business climate by reducing crime or unemployment rates, or increasing 
expenditures on public services including education. 
  
                                            
4 Proprietors’ income is the sum of nonfarm proprietors’ income and farm proprietors’ income, and the former 
accounts for over 95 percent of the total. 
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II. Empirical Specification and Data 
2.1  Arellano-Bond Estimation 
Both panels of Figure 1 provide visual support for our use of dynamic panel estimation methods.  
In Panel 1, total nonfarm proprietors’ income (NFPI) and employment (NFPE) both demonstrate 
long-run upward trends.  While NFPI displays more volatility in recessionary periods, the year-
to-year inertia in both series is evident.  Similar trends are observed in both series as shares of 
total income or employment, respectively, as shown in Panel 2 of Figure B.1.  The nonfarm 
productivity series in Panel 2 appears to move more closely with NFPI, but with greater apparent 
volatility over time. In all cases, the underlying trends are clearly observable in the national data.   
 
We choose the Arellano-Bond (AB) (1991) estimator as our baseline functional form in 
order to account for these underlying trends in the data. The main specification takes on the 
following form: Yi,t = γ1Yi,t−1 + γ2Yi,t−2 + Xi,tβ + Zi,tδ + αi + τt + ϵi,t , 
 
where Yi,t is the nonfarm proprietors’ outcome of interest in state i at time t and Yi,t−k is the 
kth lag of that outcome. The vector Xi,t includes measures of the state policy environment, while 
the vector Zi,t includes several characteristics of the state economic and demographic 
environment.  The parameter αi is a state-level fixed effect, τt is a year fixed effect, and ϵi,t is a 
well-behaved error term. 
 
Inclusion of the first and second lags of the dependent variable (Yi,t−1 and Yi,t−2) causes 
endogeneity issues for the within estimator used by a traditional fixed effect specification, as 
these terms introduce correlations with αi, the state fixed effect. The usual approach to solving 
this problem is through instrumental variables (IV), which is also the approach within the AB 
estimator. The important element of AB estimation is that it does not require instruments from 
some external source. The model is transformed into first differences, thereby eliminating the 
state-specific effects from the model. The first difference model is: 
∆Yi,t = γ1∆Yi,t−1 + γ2∆Yi,t−2 + ∆Xi,tβ + ∆Zi,tδ + ∆τt + ∆ϵi,t , 
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The AB estimator then instruments for the lag of the dependent variable in the first 
difference model with other lagged values of the dependent variable to obtain consistent 
estimates. If time T is large, many instruments are available. However, if too many instrument 
variables are used, asymptotic theory provides a poor finite sample approximation to the 
distribution of the estimator (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Therefore we set the maximum 
number of lags of the dependent variable that can be used as instruments to 3. ∆Xi,ts are assumed 
to be exogenous and are used as instruments for themselves. 
 
We also present results from the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (ABBB) (Arellano and 
Bond, 1995, and Blundell and Bond, 1998) approach as a robustness check. It is similar to the 
AB estimator except that it imposes additional restrictions on which lagged differences of the 
dependent variable are used. In other words, it uses lagged difference as well as lagged levels of 
dependent variables as instruments. When the autoregressive process is too persistent, the ABBB 
estimator performs better. The results show that the ABBB estimation provides similar evidence 
regarding the statistical significance of our variables of interest. 
 
2.2 Entrepreneurship Measures 
We measure entrepreneurial performance by relying on published state-level data on nonfarm 
proprietors’ income and employment.  Following many of the recent studies, we experiment with 
several different measures in order to provide a broader picture of the impact of tax policies on 
entrepreneurial performance broadly defined. First, based on data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), we consider nonfarm proprietors’ employment (NFPE) in a state as a share of 
total nonfarm employment in that state.  This is closest in spirit to the self-employment rates and 
similar measures that have figured prominently in the prior literature.5  In an effort to consider 
both the level and location of entrepreneurial activity, we also consider state NFPE as a share of 
national NFPE. The first measure is intended to capture the within-state variations of 
employment, while the latter is better able to account for across-state variation. Both provide an 
                                            
5 Georgellis and Wall (2006) used the proportion of the working-age population that was classified as nonfarm 
proprietors, while Bruce and Deskins (2012) used the percentage of all non-farm workers in each state who were 
sole proprietors.  Bruce and Deskins (2012) also explored state shares of national entrepreneurial activity. 
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opportunity to compare our results to those in the most recent empirical studies, which is 
important in assessing the importance of our methodological contributions in this paper. 
 
Next, we consider nonfarm proprietors’ income, both in per capita terms and as a share of 
total state personal income. National estimates of the income of nonfarm sole proprietorships and 
partnerships are based on tabulations of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax returns: net profit or 
loss reported on Schedule C of Form 1040 for sole proprietorships, ordinary business income 
from Form 1065 for partnerships, and net rental real estate income from Schedule K of Form 
1065. Because these data do not always reflect the income earned from current production and 
because they are incomplete, the estimates also include several major adjustments (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 2009). As with our employment measures, we also examine state NFPI as a 
share of national NFPI in order to assess locational effects.  We are not aware of any prior study 
that has examined state-level nonfarm proprietors’ income in an empirical test of the importance 
of state-level tax policies and other factors for entrepreneurial success.  We push this 
contribution a step further by also examining nonfarm proprietors’ productivity, or NFPI divided 
by NFPE.  This provides a measure of income per employee that more accurately captures the 
entrepreneurial success that policymakers are presumably primarily interested in supporting. 
 
There are three possible channels the change in entrepreneurship might come from. First is 
the change through switching between wage earners and the self-employed. Second is the change 
through small businesses relocating across state borders. Third is the change from people 
switching from being unemployed to self-employment. Our measures of entrepreneurship and 
explanatory controls cover all three channels. Both measures of NFPI as a share of state total 
personal income and NFPE as a share of state total employment capture the first channel that 
people switch between wage earning jobs and self-employment. The state share of national NFPI 
and NFPE capture the second channel that small businesses relocate across state border. The 
third channel is captured by including unemployment rate as a control in our regression. 
 
These measures reflect very different but perhaps equally important and complementary 
aspects of entrepreneurial performance.  Table 1 presents data for our nonfarm proprietors’ 
income measures for all states in 1978 and 2009, where all financial variables have been inflated 
29 
 
to 2009 dollars.  All but seven states saw increased NFPI per capita during our period of 
analysis, among which Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey grew the most. By 2009, 
Connecticut, New York and Texas had the highest levels of NFPI per capita, all in excess of 
$4,000. As shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table B.1, NFPI is generally on the order of five to 
eleven percent of total personal income in a state. The shares have declined over time in most 
states, although some of this is probably driven by the recession at the end of our period of 
analysis.  Columns 5 and 6 of Table B.1 show the state-specific shares of total national NFPI. 
These shares have eroded over time in most (31) states. Nevada, Arizona and Delaware 
experienced the largest percentage gains in their shares of the national total, while Iowa, West 
Virginia and Kentucky experienced the largest percentage declines. 
 
Table B.2 presents similar data for nonfarm proprietors’ employment and productivity. An 
interesting fact from Columns 1 and 2 is that NFPE has grown as a share of total state 
employment in all states during our period of analysis.  The NFPE shares of total state 
employment generally ranged from nine to seventeen percent in 1979, but ranged from 16 to 24 
percent in 2009.  While some of this growth may have been recession-related (e.g., if some 
displaced workers became nonfarm proprietors), the longer-term national trend has been positive 
as shown in Figure B.1 above.  State-specific shares of the national NFPE, shown in Columns 3 
and 4 of Table B.2, have been relatively stable over time.  Alongside the more volatile income 
shares in Table B.1, this suggests—unsurprisingly—that the most mobile entrepreneurs may 
have been the highest-income ones.  Columns 5 and 6 of Table B.2 reveal an interesting 
downward trend in nonfarm proprietors’ productivity over time in all states.  This is driven 
primarily by the surge in NFPE alongside relatively stagnant NFPI, especially during the latter 
part of our time period.  Further, the large drop between the two endpoints masks substantial 
volatility in both directions between those two years, as reflected in the national data in Figure 
B.1. 
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2.3 Data Description and Explanatory Variables 
Our primary focus is on the influence of state tax policy variables, which can affect 
entrepreneurial performance by affecting the absolute profitability of entrepreneurial ventures as 
well as the relative profitability compared to wage employment or corporate status. Following 
Bruce and Deskins (2012), we include the state sales tax rate, the top marginal state personal 
income tax (PIT) rate, and the top marginal state corporate income tax (CIT) rate.  We discuss 
each of these in turn before describing our other control variables. 
 
It is well known that the sales tax distorts business purchases (Viard, 2010), including 
distortions in business location, capital-labor ratios, and taxable purchase decisions. As sales tax 
bases have eroded in recent years, states have responded by raising sales tax rates (Bruce and 
Fox, 2000). The extent to which this impacts small business performance depends on the ability 
to pass the sales tax burden forward to consumers as well as the competitiveness of final goods 
markets.  For example, if the sales tax on office equipment used in production is passed forward 
to consumers through higher prices on final goods, which are then taxed again at the point of 
sale, small business performance can suffer if the final good market is highly competitive. In 
less-competitive final goods markets where demands might also be less elastic, the ability to shift 
the sales tax burden forward to consumers is greater and sales tax rates have less of an impact on 
small business performance.  While Bruce and Deskins (2012) found no impact of sales tax rates 
on self-employment rates, Bartik (1989) found a negative effect on start-ups. 
 
Personal income taxes (PIT) can also affect entrepreneurial activity in various ways, as 
documented in the prior literature. Theory suggests two conflicting effects with a reduction in the 
marginal tax rate (Rosen et al., 2000). With a lower PIT rate, there is an increased reward for 
effort devoted to the enterprise. One would assume proprietors would increase their effort under 
such circumstances.  At the same time, however, the old level of effort translates into greater 
after-tax profits.  The proprietors may be tempted to increase their utility by decreasing their 
work hours and consuming more leisure. The net effect is ambiguous. Besides the traditional 
income and substitution effects, when considering the effects of the policy environment on 
entrepreneurship, the general consensus is that higher tax rates could also insure against risk if 
rates are progressive and loss offset provisions  are available (Domar and Musgrave, 1944).   
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Further, when the PIT rate increases, there is an effect on the extensive margin when more 
people switch from wage and salary jobs to self-employment to avoid or evade high tax 
payments. There is also an effect on the intensive margin. Small businesses have greater 
opportunities to under- or over-report their income in response to changes in PIT rates.6 While 
several studies have found a positive relationship between personal income tax rates and 
aggregate rates of entrepreneurship (e.g., Long, 1982; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Blau, 1987; 
Parker, 1996; Bruce and Mohsin, 2006), most have used static models.  More recent surveys 
have concluded that tax policy has fundamentally ambiguous theoretical effects on 
entrepreneurial activity (Bruce and Mohsin, 2006). The various possible opposing effects may 
have contributed as well to the lack of an empirical consensus regarding the effect of PIT rates 
on entrepreneurial activity (Gurley-Calvez and Bruce, 2013).   
 
The effect of the corporate income tax (CIT) rate on investment and entrepreneurship is one 
of the central questions in public finance. The CIT rate can affect the organizational form of 
small businesses (Luna and Murray, 2010). If CIT rates are lower than PIT rates, the tax system 
provides a net subsidy to risk-taking (Cullen and Gordon, 2006). This net subsidy arises because 
an entrepreneur facing losses would prefer to face PIT rates so that the deduction of the losses 
against other income would have greater tax-reducing value. If CIT rates are higher than PIT 
rates, new businesses might choose to organize as unincorporated sole proprietorships to reduce 
taxes (Gordon and Slemrod, 2000). At the same time, high CIT rates could indicate that a state 
prefers to shift relatively more of its tax burden onto businesses (Bruce and Deskins, 2012), 
which can discourage small business activity.  As with the PIT rate, the net impact of the CIT 
rate on entrepreneurial performance is fundamentally ambiguous. 
 
Like Bruce and Deskins (2012), we include a variety of other features of state tax portfolios 
in our empirical models.  First, we include the sales factor weight in each state’s CIT 
apportionment formula (used to apportion multi-state firms’ income among the states in which 
they have a taxable presence). States traditionally used a three-factor formula with equal weight 
                                            
6 Saez (2010) found clear evidence of income adjustments around budget kink points among the self-employed, 
specifically in the form of over-stated self-employment income to maximize the value of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit. 
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on sales, payroll, and property, but many states have opted to increase the weight on sales in 
order to reduce the tax burden on in-state factors of production (Luna and Murray, 2010). Thus, 
higher sales factor weights might be associated with more entrepreneurial activity within a 
state’s borders (Bruce and Deskins, 2012). 
 
We also account for the presence of tax amnesty programs, which are limited-time 
opportunities for taxpayers to pay overdue taxes in exchange for forgiveness of tax penalties. 
The Internal Revenue Service has identified small businesses and sole proprietorships as the 
largest contributor to the tax gap (Black, et al., 2012). By providing amnesty, the state gives 
small businesses (as well as other taxpayers, depending on the amnesty regime) a convenient 
option if they have fallen behind or cheated on prior tax responsibilities. However, the possibility 
of a future amnesty may offer small businesses incentives for greater current tax evasion.  
 
We include a measure of per capita state government spending as a proxy for the overall 
level of public services.  Theory suggests that government expenditures have direct and indirect 
effects on small businesses. The expenditure may be delivered as a direct subsidy to local 
entrepreneurial activity, or it could provide indirect benefits in the form of more complete 
infrastructure or better education, both of which may improve opportunities for entrepreneurial 
success.7 Total expenditures can also proxy for the overall tax burden in a state, which can be a 
deterrent to small business performance as discussed above. 
 
Non-tax explanatory variables include the following measures of the state economic 
environment: the unemployment rate, the rate of nonfarm job growth, and the share of gross state 
product (GSP) in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. These variables can be interpreted 
in many ways. For example, the unemployment rate can be interpreted as a measure of the health 
of a state’s economy, and also can be interpreted as an indicator of the number of people with 
limited opportunities for wage-and-salary employment who might be pushed into self-
employment (Georgellis and Wall, 2002; Parker, 1996). 
                                            
7 We had also hoped to include a measure of tax and non-tax incentive programs in the states, but were unable to 
find consistent data for a long-enough time period.  Prior work has considered basic counts of incentive programs, 
but it is not clear that such a measure provides meaningful information given that no two programs are alike, either 
within or across states.  Moreover, the mere existence of a program says nothing about its actual use. 
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We also include the following state demographic variables: population density, the percent 
of the population older than age 64, the property crime rate, and the female percentage of total 
population. Higher population density indicates more abundant small business clientele or more 
competitive markets. Most studies of self-employment and entrepreneurship indicate that the 
self-employed are significantly older than the wage-employed (Shane, 1996). Other research has 
suggested that those in or near retirement are more likely to become entrepreneurs (Cahill, 
Giandrea, and Quinn, 2013). Older people might be familiar with the industry and have more 
experience, or they may have more available sources of funding than other age groups to start the 
business. In addition, time in the labor force allows a person to develop a personal reputation and 
good will. This reputation is important to draw clientele from among the customers of previous 
employers, which is an important source of customers for new businesses (Aronson, 1991).  
 
Names, definitions, and means are provided for all variables for 1978 and 2009 in Table 
B.3.  Tax trends worth highlighting include the growth in sales and top CIT tax rates alongside a 
decline in the average top PIT rate, and the large increase in the sales factor weight in CIT 
apportionment formulas.  Specifically speaking, 38 out of 50 states have raised their sales tax 
rate from 1978 to 2009. California increased its sales tax rate from 4.75% to 8.25%, which was 
the highest sales tax rate in the country. Idaho and Iowa were among the states with highest 
growth rate of sales tax rate. They doubled the rate from 3% to 6%. Top CIT rate has a similar 
time trend. 29 states raised their top CIT rate, among which Indiana almost tripled its CIT rate 
from 3% to 8.5%.  Moreover, more than 30 states increased their CIT apportionment formula. 
Top PIT rate dropped in 21 states. Alaska experienced the most dramatic change. It eliminated 
state PIT in 1980, and the top PIT rate before that was 14.5%. In the meanwhile, 13 states raised 
their top PIT rate, and 16 states kept their top PIT rate the same since 1978. For the non-tax 
variables, we observe a recession-related increase in the average unemployment rate, the aging 
of the population, and the decline in the agricultural and manufacturing shares of GSP. 
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III. Results and Discussion 
3.1  Effects of State Tax Rates and Rules on Entrepreneurship 
Arellano-Bond regressions of state entrepreneurial outcomes on statutory tax rates, other 
indicators of state tax policies, and the full set of non-tax controls are provided in Table B.4; 
these are our baseline specifications for discussion. Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond results are 
presented in Table B.5 for comparison purposes. Following a discussion of the dynamic panel 
results, we then provide a step-by-step comparison to earlier results from the literature that have 
been derived from traditional fixed effects models.  Due to the underlying trends in the data and 
semi-durability of entrepreneurial performance, the dynamic specifications in Tables B.4 and B.5 
more accurately capture the underlying data generating process by allowing for lags of the 
dependent variables to be considered as explanatory variables within the model. Two lags of the 
dependent variables were necessary in order to remove higher-order serial correlation; test 
statistics for second-order autocorrelation and higher failed to reject the null hypothesis that there 
is no serial correlation in the error terms.  
 
To summarize the AB results in Table B.4, we find that state tax policies generally have no 
statistically significant effects on any of our measures of entrepreneurial performance. There are 
some differences between our AB results in Table B.4 and our ABBB results in Table B.5, 
however.  Specifically, in Table B.5, we find that higher sales tax rates and lower top CIT rates 
are positively associated with entrepreneurial productivity (Column 6) and higher top PIT rates 
negatively affect state shares of national NFPE (Column 5).  These significant results are 
isolated, however, and not robust to alternative specifications. 
 
The results also show that capturing the long-run trends in entrepreneurial outcomes is 
important for correct inference into the effects of state tax policies, as the lags of the dependent 
variables are always statistically significant predictors.  While our main tax rate results echo 
those of Bruce and Deskins (2012), they are not consistent with other results in the prior 
literature.  This could be based on our intensive-margin focus on entrepreneurial performance, or 
it could also be driven by our use of a dynamic specification.  We return to this discussion below.   
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Our results reveal very few tax policy options for fostering greater entrepreneurial success.  
Consistent with Bruce and Deskins (2012), we find that states with higher sales factor weights in 
the CIT apportionment formula tend to have slightly lower NFPI per capita (Column 1), and 
consequently lower entrepreneurial productivity (Column 6).  These negative effects, along with 
the statistically insignificant effects of the sales factor weight in other specifications, reveals the 
general notion that higher sales factor weights are generally intended to favor larger in-state 
businesses.  Similar results are not found, however, in the ABBB models in Table B.5.  Another 
potentially-important policy variable is the state government expenditures per capita, which has a 
significant and positive impact on entrepreneurial productivity (Column 6 of Table B.4).  This 
suggests that that such things as infrastructure, schools, and public safety can be more important 
contributors to entrepreneurial success than tax cuts.  This result does not hold up in the ABBB 
results in Table B.5, however, where expenditures are actually found to have no effect on 
productivity (Column 6) and a slightly negative effect on NFPE as a share of total employment 
(Column 4). We look forward to exploring the differential impact of various specific categories 
of spending in future research. 
 
Looking briefly at the results in Columns 3 and 5 of Table B.4, we find that state policies 
also do not appear to have significant impacts on the location of entrepreneurial activity as 
measured by state shares of national NFPI or NFPE.  The only exception to this is seen in 
Column 5 of Table B.5, where the top PIT rate is found to have a small negative effect on state 
shares of national NFPE. This echoes the finding of Dahl and Sorenson (2012) that small 
businesses are not particularly mobile. Many small businesses may be tied to location because of 
family or other non-entrepreneurial employment.  
 
3.2  Effects of Economic and Demographic Variables on Entrepreneurship 
Consistent with Georgellis and Wall (2006) and Bruce and Deskins (2012), we find that a higher 
unemployment rate is associated with more entrepreneurial income and employment as a share 
of a state’s total income and employment. The result is not surprising, since more unemployment 
might signal the loss of non-entrepreneurial income or labor in the denominator of these state 
shares.  It might also be driven by shifts from wage jobs into the entrepreneurial sector. 
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Interestingly, as revealed by the relative magnitudes of the unemployment rate coefficients in 
Columns 2 and 4 and the significant negative impact of the unemployment rate on 
entrepreneurial productivity in Column 6, the effect on NFPE exceeds that on NFPI. One 
possible explanation is that a higher unemployment rate might drive new less-productive labor to 
the entrepreneurial sector.   
 
States with older populations (i.e., with more residents over age 64) tend to have lower 
NFPE as a share of total employment (Column 4), but also higher entrepreneurial productivity 
(Column 6).  These results, which are not supported in Table B.5, run counter to most studies of 
self-employment and entrepreneurship, which indicate that the self-employed are significantly 
older than the wage employed (e.g., Shane, 1996).  Nonfarm job growth is unsurprisingly 
associated with more NFPI per capita, higher state shares of national NFPI, and more NFPE as a 
share of total employment.  At the same time, stronger job growth means lower entrepreneurial 
productivity. We also find that states with higher property crime rates tend to have lower NFPI 
per capita. Higher population density is positively associated with the NFPE share of total state 
employment.  
 
State industrial structure is also an important determinant of state entrepreneurial activity in 
the expected direction.  Specifically, we find that states with more dependence on manufacturing 
(as measured by the share of GSP) tend to have lower NFPI per capita and as a share of total 
state income, and also NFPE as a share of total employment.  We suspect that this is driven by 
the availability of more and better jobs in manufacturing, which might keep some potential 
entrepreneurs from starting new businesses. Finally, we also find that states with larger shares of 
their GSP in the agriculture sector tend to have lower NFPI as a share of total income, as 
expected. 
 
3.3  A Note on the Importance of Dynamic Estimation 
Comparing our results to those in the prior literature is difficult because we have made more than 
one major departure from earlier empirical studies.  We have relied on dynamic panel regression, 
and have also used intensive-margin measures of entrepreneurial performance while also 
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expanding the list of control variables and the time period of analysis.  In order to learn more 
about the importance of dynamic estimation in this literature, we now present a series of 
estimates that are intended to provide the closest possible comparison to the most recent study in 
this literature.  Specifically, we begin with results from Bruce and Deskins (2012), who 
estimated fixed effect models using a 50-state panel of tax policy information from 1989 through 
2002. One of their outcome measures—sole proprietor employment as a share of total 
employment—is very similar to our measure of NFPE as a share of total state employment.8 
 
We begin by showing the Bruce and Deskins (2012) results in Column 1 of Table B.6.  In 
Column 2, we provide our AB results from Column 4 of Table B.4.  The use of a common 
dependent variable for this exercise reduces the number of differences between these two 
columns to our use of (1) dynamic estimation, (2) more control variables, and (3) more years.  In 
Column 3 of Table B.6, we remove all three of these changes in an attempt to simply replicate 
the Bruce and Deskins (2012) results.  Our results are indeed very similar, with any noticeable 
differences being attributed to revisions to the data being used.   
 
In Columns 4 through 7, we make one change at a time in order to determine the effects of 
each improvement over the prior work.  Starting with Column 4, we see that simply adding new 
control variables generates statistical significance that was not present in the replication in 
Column 3.  A similar result emerges in Column 5 when we use the Bruce and Deskins 
specification but add more years of data.  If we had just updated their study with new data and 
more years, we would have gotten significant results on some of the tax variables.     
 
Our use of a dynamic estimation strategy is not solely responsible for the loss of statistical 
significance, however, as significance patterns are also affected when we use the Bruce and 
Deskins specification and time period but estimate an AB model instead of their fixed effects 
model.  In other words, if Bruce and Deskins would have used the AB method, they would have 
concluded that higher top PIT rates have a positive impact on entrepreneurial employment as a 
                                            
8 The difference is that the measure of employment share in Bruce and Deskins (2012) is obtained by dividing the 
number of sole proprietors in each state by the total national number of sole proprietors. Our measure of 
employment share is dividing the total number of nonfarm proprietors’ employment in each state by the total 
national number of nonfarm proprietors’ employment. 
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share of total employment.  This suggests that the more recent years of data—from 2003 through 
2009—are what drive the importance of using dynamic estimation.   
3.4  Sensitivity Analysis 
We perform a series of sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of our results.9 In order to test 
if the results are robust to potential variations in the Great Recession (2008-2009), we exclude 
this time period from the regression (Table B.7). We also run a separate regression excluding 
Alaska and Hawaii to rule out potential influence from outliers (Table B.8). Both regressions 
show similar results as our main regression. None of the state tax policies has significant effect 
on small businesses’ activity. 
 
Next, we use lagged tax variables in Arellano-Bond estimation (Table B.9). The results are 
very similar. Most of the tax variables have no effect on small businesses’ outcome, except very 
small economic effect from sales tax and personal income tax. Results show that with 1 
percentage point increase in state sales tax rate, nonfarm proprietors’ income per capita decreases 
by 40 cents. When top state personal income tax rate increases by 1 percentage point, nonfarm 
proprietors’ employment share in a state decreases by 0.02 percent.  Overall, the sensitivity 
analyses confirm the robustness of our results.  
IV. Conclusion 
This paper uses state-level panel data from 1978 to 2009 to examine the relationship between 
state tax policies and entrepreneurial performance.  The estimation strategies in the earlier 
literature have neglected to account for the underlying trends in entrepreneurial outcomes. We 
take advantage of Arellano-Bond dynamic estimators and also explore several new measures of 
entrepreneurial success. Our results indicate that most state tax policies do not have statistically 
significant effects on aggregate entrepreneurial income, employment, or productivity. Compared 
to the prior literature, these results suggest that tax policy may have more meaningful impacts on 
the extensive (i.e., participation) margin rather than intensive (i.e., success) margin. These results 
are important in the design of state tax policy, especially in light of the recent debate over 
eliminating the personal income tax—either in total or on pass-through income—in some states.  
                                            
9 Full reports on sensitivity analysis are available upon request. 
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Unless participation alone is an important and desired outcome, there is no meaningful role for 
tax policy. 
While the results indicate that tax policies are probably not the best choice for state 
governments interested in engineering improvements in entrepreneurial outcomes, a few non- tax 
policy instruments emerge as possible candidates. For example, states can and should work to 
reduce property crime rates, as lower crime translates into better entrepreneurial success in our 
models. In general it would appear that a stronger business climate is an important ingredient to 
the success of small businesses.  States should also continue to work to improve overall 
economic growth as our results show that lower unemployment rates and higher rates of 
employment growth are strongly associated with better entrepreneurial success.  A strong 
economy helps drive entrepreneurial success.   
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Abstract 
This chapter uses time series analysis to explore the effect of federal tax policy on 
entrepreneurial performance. We examine whether the effect is heterogeneous across different 
phases of the business cycle, which has not yet been explored in the literature. Indeed, we find 
evidence that tax policy does affect the small business sector differently during the economic ups 
and downs. Additionally, we use nonfarm proprietor’s income as a direct measure of 
entrepreneurial success and we investigate several measures of small business performance 
derived from nonfarm proprietors’ income and employment data, including a measure of 
productivity (i.e. nonfarm proprietors’ income per employed person). This paper extends the 
earlier research by including the most recent years until 2012. Our standard time series model 
shows that federal tax policy does affect entrepreneurial performance, but the effects are very 
small. Further analysis using the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) reveals that changes to 
the federal tax policy affect changes in entrepreneurship. 
 
Keywords: Federal tax policy; Small business; Business cycles 
JEL Classification Numbers: H2, H7 
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I. Introduction 
As discussed broadly in Chapter 2, state tax policies have little impact on entrepreneurial 
performance and productivity. This chapter explores the effect of federal tax policy on small 
businesses. Have the federal tax policies affected entrepreneurial performance and productivity? 
In addition, have the effects changed across different phases of the business cycle? 
 
Compared to state tax policies, tax rates at the federal level exhibit a more volatile 
pattern. Previous time-series literature examining the effect of federal tax policy on small 
businesses has found that the federal tax rates (e.g. the personal income tax rate, corporate 
income tax rate and the capital gains tax rate) affect the small business sector. Blau (1987) used 
time series data to study self-employment in the US. He found higher marginal tax rates in the 
upper income brackets had a positive effect on self-employment. However, the estimation 
method he used did not account for the orders of integration, which could possibly generate 
spurious results (Granger, 1986). Parker (1996) improved the estimation technique by exploiting 
cointegration analysis. He used United Kingdom time series data and found higher marginal tax 
rates encouraged self-employment. More recent studies found statistically significant but 
economically small effects of the federal tax policy. Bruce and Mohsin (2006) extended the 
literature by considering a more complete set of tax policies and using more recent data and 
modern econometrics techniques. They found most of the federal taxes had significant but small 
effects on self-employment activity. Other related studies used cross-sectional or panel data to 
examine the relationship between federal tax policies and small businesses. Results from these 
studies were less conclusive, and some of them focused on tax policies at the state level (Gentry 
and Hubbard, 2000; Bruce and Deskins, 2012).  
 
Besides the significant amount of research on if and how much tax policy can influence 
entrepreneurial activity, the relationship between entrepreneurship and the business cycle also 
received considerable attention. In theory, entrepreneurship could either be anti- or pro-cyclical 
(Congregado et. al., 2012). During business downturns, unemployed or laid-off workers were 
pushed into self-employment because of the weak labor market. In addition, Francois and Lloyd-
Ellis (2003) stated that if entrepreneurs could separate production and sales, they would have 
incentives to enter during recessions.  In other words, entrepreneurs would do best if they could 
46 
 
do research and development when the cost was low (recession) and sold when demand was high 
(boom). Koellinger and Thurik (2012) used a cross-country panel of 22 OECD countries for the 
period 1972 to 2007, and found the entrepreneurial cycle was positively affected by the national 
unemployment rate. Constant and Zimmermann (2004) used micro data from Germany and 
found unemployment rates drove people into self-employment. Fairlie (2013) found similar 
results using the US data. He found higher local unemployment rates increased the probability 
that individuals started businesses. 
 
Other studies found pro-cyclical relationships between self-employment and the business 
cycle. Rampini (2004) suggested that more agents became entrepreneurs when productivity was 
high (boom), because agents were more willing to bear risk. Blanchflower (2000) examined 
OECD countries and found negative relationships between the self-employment rate and the 
unemployment rate. Besides the pro- and anti- cycle relationships, some research argued that 
small businesses were less sensitive to the business cycle than wage and salary employment (Yu 
et al. 2014).  
 
Most of the prior studies focused on extensive-margin measures of entrepreneurial 
activity, such as entrepreneurial entry and exit (Gurley-Calvez and Bruce, 2013) or self-
employment rates (Bruce and Mohsin, 2006). This paper is the first time series study to look at 
the intensive margin of small businesses. We use a number of intensive-margin measures of 
nonfarm proprietors’ success. Specifically, we use nonfarm proprietors’ income (NFPI) as a 
direct measure of small businesses success. We also consider nonfarm proprietors’ employment 
(NFPE) to compare with previous literature. Moreover, we use nonfarm proprietors’ productivity 
(i.e., NFPI divided by NFPE) to capture the efficiency of the small businesses. We also explore if 
the effects of federal tax policy vary across different stages of the business cycle. Not only do we 
examine the effect of federal tax on entrepreneurship, we also look into the effect of the change 
of tax rates on the change of entrepreneurship through Vector Error Correction Models (VECM). 
Additionally, we consider the most recent years until 2012. No time series study has yet been 
able to make use of the variation in tax policy brought by tax cuts in the early 2000s.  
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II. Empirical Strategy and Data 
2.1 Entrepreneurial Measures and Explanatory Variables 
Following Chapter 2, we use nonfarm proprietors’ income (NFPI) as a direct measure of 
small businesses’ success. As discussed broadly in Chapter 2, there are several advantages of 
using NFPI as a measure of entrepreneurship. We constructed  time series data from 1969 to 
2012 using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Similar to Chapter 2, we 
consider four measures of entrepreneurship: nonfarm proprietors’ income per capita and as a 
share of total national personal income, nonfarm proprietors’ employment (NFPE) as a share of 
total nonfarm employment in the US and nonfarm proprietors’ productivity, or NFPI divided by 
NFPE.  All four measures are similar to those in Chapter 2, but focus on the national level.10 
 
Figure 1 presents the time trends of NFPI and NFPE from 1969 to 2012, overlayed with 
dashed lines representing troughs of the business cycle. NFPE exhibits a stable upward trend 
over time. NFPI also has an upward time trend, but it seems to be more sensitive to the business 
cycle. Low points on the NFPI line are corresponding to troughs in the business cycle. Figure 2 
presents the time trends of NFPI share, NFPE share and productivity. Both NFPI share and 
NFPE share show steady upward trends, while NFPI share is more sensitive to business cycle. 
Productivity is substantially more volatile over time.  
 
Our primary focus is the effect of federal tax policy variables and their interaction with 
the business cycle. Following Bruce and Mohsin (2006), we include the top personal income tax 
rate, corporate income tax rate, payroll tax rate, capital gains tax rate and estate tax exemption. 
We also consider the prime rate and government expenditure. Since most of the discussion on tax 
variables resembles those in Chapter 2, we only discuss each of them briefly. 
 
Personal income tax (PIT) can influence small businesses in various ways. In theory, the 
effect of PIT on entrepreneurship is ambiguous. First, an increase in the PIT rate reduces after-
tax income, which discourages entrepreneurship. However, due to the fact that the US tax code is 
                                            
10 Please refer to Chapter 2 for detailed discussions of these measures of entrepreneurship. 
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progressive, small businesses can deduct business losses to reduce the total tax. This loss-offset 
provision encourages small businesses and provides insurance against risk (Domar and 
Musgrave, 1944). Moreover, small business income is not subject to third-party reporting. Being 
self-employed brings more tax evasion opportunities than working at a wage and salary job.   
 
The corporate income tax (CIT) can affect the organizational form of small businesses 
(Luna and Murray, 2010). If CIT rates are higher than PIT rates, new businesses might choose to 
organize as unincorporated sole proprietorships to reduce taxes (Gordon and Slemrod, 2000). 
Therefore, an increase in CIT rate is expected to increase entrepreneurial employment. Payroll 
tax on self-employed income started in 1951. It rose steadily from 2.25 percent to 15.30 percent. 
Payroll tax accounts for a significant part of small businesses’ tax burden. Not only does the self-
employed need to pay the employer part of the Social Security and Medicare taxes, but they also 
need to pay the employee part of the taxes. Raising payroll tax rate might decrease both income 
and employment in the small business sector. Capital gains tax affects both venture capital on 
start-up firms and the behavior of entrepreneurship (Poterba, 1989). Reduction in capital gains 
tax can boost venture capital, as well as the demand for venture funds from entrepreneurs.  
 
Figure 2 shows time series plots for four key federal tax rate measures: the top marginal 
income tax rate, the top corporate income tax rate, the top capital gains tax rate and the payroll 
tax rate. Despite a small increase in the early 1990s, the top personal income tax rate exhibits a 
downward time trend. The top corporate income tax rate exhibits a stable downward trend. The 
payroll tax rate has a steady upward trend over time, although the change is not substantial. The 
top capital gains tax rate increased in the early 1970s and 1980s, but it has been trending 
downward since then.  
 
The estate tax reduces the return to savings, increases the cost of capital and reduces 
investment. Holtz-Eakin (1999) estimated that the estate tax reduced annual investment by 
entrepreneurship by 2–6 percent. However, other study suggested that the effect of the estate tax 
on entrepreneurship was very small (Poterba, 1997). We measure the burden of the estate tax 
using the exemption amount. The prime rate can be used to measure the cost of small business 
loans. Many small business loans are also indexed to the prime rate. Government investment 
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expenditure includes gross investment in structures, equipment and intellectual property 
(software, R&D) at the federal level.  
 
Most of the previous studies use the unemployment rate as an indicator for the business 
cycle (Constant and Zimmermann, 2004; Fairlie, 2011; Yu et al., 2014). We argue that although 
the unemployment rate captures important features in the labor market, there are more factors 
determining the business cycle. We use the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)’s 
business cycle by creating a dummy for years when the economy is in a recession. The NBER 
publishes the US business cycle expansions and contractions (recessions) on its website. It 
defines peaks and troughs in economic activity by examining the behavior of various measures 
of broad activity: real GDP measured on the production and income sides, economy-wide 
employment, and real income. It also considers indicators that do not cover the entire economy, 
such as real sales and the Federal Reserve’s index of industrial production (IP) (NBER, 2014). 
We also consider the interaction terms between tax policy and the business cycle to allow tax to 
affect on entrepreneurial performance to vary across the different stages of the business cycle. 
 
 We include the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to capture the safety net effect on 
entrepreneurship. Specifically, the EITC benefit is measured by the minimum income for 
maximum credit of a representative household.11 Following the earlier literature, we include 
other economic controls such as real GDP growth rate, real minimum wage rate, stock of wealth, 
percent of population 65 years old and older, percent of population with a high school degree and 
number of work stoppages involving 1000 or more workers. Detailed data definitions are in 
Table C.1. 
 
Table C.2 presents summary statistics of 1969 and 2012, where all financial variables 
have been inflated to 2009 dollars. Both nonfarm proprietors’ income per capita and income as 
share of total personal income in the US increased from 1969 to 2012. Nonfarm proprietors’ 
employment as a share of total nonfarm employment in the US doubled from 1969 to 2012.  
                                            
11 We define the representative household as the one adult with one child. 
50 
 
2.2 Unit Root Tests and Cointegration Analysis 
Before we explore any possible relationships between tax policies and entrepreneurship, we need 
to examine detailed properties of the variables. First we look at the stationarity of the data. If our 
variables are not stationary, the standard assumptions for asymptotic analysis will not be valid. 
We start with standard unit root tests. We employ the modified Dickey-Fuller t test (DF-GLS), 
Phillips-Perron (PP) test, and Kwiatkowsi-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test for unit root 
testing. These tests are standard in the literature and hence a detailed discussion is omitted. 
Detailed test results are in Table C.3. Columns 2 and 3 contain results from DF-GLS and PP test. 
Optimal number of lags is determined by Shwarz’s (SBC) criterion. Test results for most 
variables do not reject the null hypothesis of non-stationary in levels while rejecting the null in 
first differences at the 10% level. Columns 4 to 7 contain results from KPSS tests. The null 
hypothesis of KPSS tests is stationarity. Test results for all variables reject the null of 
stationarity. Overall, unit root tests show evidence of non-stationarity of order one (I(1)).  
 
Next we need to examine if cointegration exists in the data. If there is no cointegration, 
the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is not required, and we should use a first-difference 
model to examine the relationship between tax policy and entrepreneurship. However, if 
cointegration exists, in addition to traditional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, we need the 
VECM in order to evaluate the long run properties of the cointegrated series. In other words, the 
VECM is used to examine the impact of changes in tax rates on the changes in entrepreneurship.  
 
Cointegration typically refers to a linear combination of non-stationary variables. Even 
though a set of variables is non-stationary, a linear combination of them might be stationary. 
Such variables are said to be cointegrated. We consider four sets of possible cointegrations, one 
set for each measure of entrepreneurship. The controls are top personal income tax rate, top 
corporate income tax rate, payroll tax rate, top capital gains tax rate, and estate tax. The results 
from cointegration tests are in Table C.4. Panel A is trace test, and Panel B is minimizing 
information criterion test (Hannan and Quinn information criterion, HQIC). To sum up, we find 
strong evidence of cointegration. For each of the four entrepreneurship measures, both tests 
reject the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors. In fact, the test results suggest there are at 
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least two stable relationships between each our measures of entrepreneurship and tax policies, in 
the presence of other important economic variables (government expenditure and the prime rate). 
 
 Following Bruce and Mohsin (2006), we perform bivariate cointegration tests to get more 
directly at the extent to which entrepreneurial activity is affected by tax policies. We find strong 
evidence that all tax rates are cointegrated with all four entrepreneurial measures, as shown in 
Table C.5. It suggests that all taxes and entrepreneurial performance have stable long run 
relationships.  
 
 Overall, the tests suggest that our variables are I(1) and cointegrated. Therefore, we use 
both OLS regression and VECM to examine the effects of tax policies on entrepreneurship. 
2.3 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Results 
We start with a standard time series OLS regression approach. Dependent variables are four 
measures of entrepreneurship: NFPI per capita, NFPI as a share of total income in the US, NFPE 
as a share of total nonfarm employment in the US, and nonfarm proprietors’ productivity. Our 
set of tax variables includes the top personal income, corporate income, payroll, capital gains, 
and estate tax. We also include interaction terms between tax variables and the business cycle. 
We hope to capture the heterogeneous effects of policy across the business cycle through the 
interaction terms. The regression equation is: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑡 + 𝜃𝑍𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡      
  𝑌𝑡 is a vector of four measures of entrepreneurship at time 𝑡. 𝑋𝑡 is a vector of tax 
variables plus the prime rate and the federal expenditure. 𝐷𝑡 is a dummy which equals one if the 
economy is in a recession. 𝑍𝑡 is a set of economic controls. 𝜖𝑡 is the error term.  
 
Before estimating standard OLS, we need to examine possible heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation. The Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroskedasticity do not reject the null of 
constant variance, which means heteroskedasticity is not our concern. However, the Breusch-
Godfrey LM tests suggest evidence of serial correlation. Therefore, we report Newey-West serial 
correlation consistent standard errors. 
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 Table C.6 presents a full set of results from multivariate OLS regressions. The results 
suggest that there are possible policy and macroeconomic variables that can potentially explain 
the change in entrepreneurial performance. Beginning with the tax variables, we find that a one- 
percentage-point increase in the top personal income tax rate will increase NFPI per capita by 
$27.99. It suggests possible tax evasion response from the small businesses when PIT rate goes 
up. It also increases NFPI as a share of total income by 0.07 percent and productivity only by 44 
cents. We also find a one-percentage-point increase in the top PIT rate reduces NFPE as a share 
of total nonfarm employment by a near-zero percentage (0.007 percent). It means that even with 
a 100-percentage-point increase in the top PIT rate, NFPE share would only decrease by 0.7 
percent. The results are similar to the findings in Bruce and Mohsin (2006). They also find that 
the top income tax rate has no economically significant effect on entrepreneurial employment. 
We do not find any difference of the effects of the PIT during different phases of the business 
cycle. Overall, the influence of the top PIT rate on entrepreneurship is very small. 
 
A one-percentage-point increase in the top corporate income tax rate increases NFPE 
share by 0.023 percent. The positive coefficient suggests possible substitution between the 
corporate and incorporate business forms. Small businesses are less likely to stay incorporated 
when facing an increasing CIT rate. But again, the magnitude is very small. Our results are 
similar to those in Bruce and Mohsin (2006), who find that there is no significant effect of the 
top CIT rate on the small businesses’ employment rate. We find that an increase the top CIT rate 
reduces NFPI per capita, NFPI share and productivity. We do not find any difference of the 
effects from the CIT across the business cycle. 
 
We find that the top self-employment payroll tax rate has no significant effect on any of 
the measures of entrepreneurship. Our findings confirm those in Bruce and Mohsin (2006). The 
top capital gains rate has no effect on any measures of entrepreneurship, but we find that it 
slightly reduces NFPI share during a recession. In a recession, a one-percentage-point increase in 
the top capital gains tax rate reduces NFPI share by 0.047 percent.  
 
We find that the estate tax exemption exerts a negative effect on all measures of 
entrepreneurship except for the employment rate. It is different from the results in Bruce and 
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Mohsin (2006). They used estate tax exclusion for small businesses as a measure of the estate tax 
burden, and they did not find any statistically significant effect from it. We attribute the 
difference to the recent time periods we include in our sample.12 We will return to this next. We 
further find the estate tax reduces NFPI share and productivity during a recession, and it 
increases NFPE share. 
 
Previous studies find that the prime rate negatively affects small businesses (Parker, 
1996; Bruce and Mohsin, 2006). We find that the prime rate only has a negative effect on 
entrepreneurship during a recession. The difference between our results and previous studies 
further emphasizes the importance of distinguishing different stages of the business cycle. The 
government expenditure and the EITC benefits do not have economically significant effects on 
small businesses.  
 
 The stock of wealth shows positive but economically small effects on four measures of 
entrepreneurship. Surprisingly, GDP growth rate has no discernible influence on any of our 
entrepreneurship measures. Consistent with Bruce and Mohsin (2006), we find that an increase 
of minimum wage reduces NFPE share. An increase in minimum wage could suggest an increase 
in hiring cost of small businesses, which might lead to a decrease in entrepreneurial employment. 
There are some interesting findings in labor market characteristics. Contrary to previous studies, 
we find that an increase in the share of older population (65 years old and older) decreases all 
measures of entrepreneurship except for employment. Echoing the findings of Bruce and Mohsin 
(2006), we find that an increase in the share of the population with a high school education 
reduces all measures of entrepreneurship except for employment.  
 
To summarize the results in Table C.6, we find tax policies do play a role in 
entrepreneurial activity, but the effects are very small. What is more important, some of them 
have different effects on small businesses during different stages of the business cycle.  
                                            
12 Detailed comparison to Bruce and Mohsin is in Table C. 10. 
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2.4 Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) Results 
We continue our analysis using Vector Error Correlation Model (VECM) to explore causal 
relationships between the changes of tax rates and the changes of entrepreneurship. VECM is a 
restricted Vector Autoregression (VAR) designed for use with non-stationary series that are 
known to be conintegrated. It allows the long run behavior of the endogenous variables to 
converge to their long run equilibrium relationships while allowing a wide range of short run 
dynamics. For each measure of entrepreneurship, the cointegration equation is: 
𝑌1,𝑡 = 𝛽2𝑌2,𝑡 + ⋯+ 𝛽7𝑌7,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
The corresponding VEC model is: 
∆𝑌𝑡 = ∏(𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 −�𝛽𝑗6
𝑗≠𝑖
𝑌𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝛤∆𝑌𝑡−1+𝐵𝑍𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑡 = (𝑌1𝑡, … ,𝑌𝑘𝑡)′ is a (𝐾 × 1) vector of endogenous variables (i.e., tax variables plus 
prime rate and expenditure); (𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 − ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑗,𝑡−16𝑗≠𝑖 ) are the error correction terms. In long run 
equilibrium, this term is zero. However, if 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 deviate from the long run equilibrium, the error 
correction term will be nonzero and each variable adjusts to partially restore the equilibrium 
relation. The parameter matrix ∏ measures the speed of adjustment of the k-th endogenous 
variable towards the equilibrium.13 𝑍𝑡 is a vector of exogenous macroeconomic and labor market 
controls, including interaction terms of tax policy and a dummy for recessions.14 We estimated 
four sets of the VECMs with k cointegration relations and one lag. The full results are in Table 
C.7.  
 
The coefficients of the error-correction terms of tax variables are all significant except for 
the productivity. The coefficients suggest different speeds of convergence to equilibrium. For 
instance, the speed of convergence to equilibrium for NFPE share is 0.245 percent. Thus in the 
short run, NFPE share is adjusted by 0.245 percent of the past year’s deviation from equilibrium. 
It depicts the stability of the system. One of the coefficients of the error correction terms for the 
NFPI share is positive, which implies that the system is unstable. It could be due to any 
                                            
13 We get the numbers of cointegrating equations k from the cointegration tests (Table C.4). 
14 We also run robustness checks using lagged terms of the exogenous variables, and the results are robust. 
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disturbance in the system, and divergence from equilibrium will take place. It is consistent with 
the highly volatile trend of entrepreneurial productivity (Figure C.2).  
 
We find the changes of tax rates do not have much influence on the changes of 
entrepreneurship. There are only two effects from the changes of taxes. A one-percentage-point 
increase in the change of the corporate income tax rates reduces the change of NFPI share by 0.1 
percent. It means a more volatile corporate income tax rate actually leads to a more stable NFPI 
share. We attribute it to the possible explanation that the self-employed prefer to stay 
incorporated when the corporate income tax rates are volatile.  
 
We do not find tax policies influence the changes of entrepreneurial success during a 
recession. Other than tax variables, the exogenous macroeonomic and labor market conditions 
also influence the volatility of the small businesses. A one dollar increase in government 
expenditure decreases the volatility of NFPI per capita by 0.007 percent. The GDP growth rate 
increases the volatility of NFPI per capita. A one-percentage-point increase in the GDP growth 
rate increases the change in NFPI per capita by 41 dollars. A larger share of the older population 
and a larger share of high school graduates both reduce the volatility of NFPE share. 
 
2.5 Sensitivity Analyses  
To check the robustness of our results, we run a series of regressions as sensitivity analyses. 
First, we test some alternative specifications to caputure the business cycle impact (Table C.8 
and Table C.9). Recall that in the main regression, we use NBER’s business cycle, and we do not 
find the effects of tax policies vary across different stages of the business cycle. We consider 
using GDP growth rate as an indicator for the business cycle. One of the stylized facts in 
Macroeconomics is that real GDP rises during an expansion and falls during a recession. The 
OLS regression using GSP growth rate as a measure of the business cycle turns out to have a 
robust result (Table C.8). The effect of the federal tax rates on entrepreneurial success is 
economically small. We do not observe difference across different stages of the business cycle 
either. 
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 Next we measure the business cycle by the unemployment rate. Most of the results are 
similar to those in the main specification. The effect of taxes on entrepreneurship is small and 
most of them are indifferent when the unemployment rate changes. 
 
 The last part of our sensitivity analyses is to present a series of estimates that are intended 
to provide the closest possible comparison to previous study by Bruce and Mohsin (2006). We 
begin with results from Bruce and Mohsin (2006), who estimated standard time series model 
(OLS) from 1949 to 1999. One of their outcome measures—the number of individual income tax 
returns with income from a small business as a share of all individual income tax returns—is 
very similar to our measure of NFPE as a share of total nonfarm employment.15 
 
 We begin by showing the Bruce and Mohsin (2006) results in Column 1 of Table C.10. In 
Column 2, we provide our results from Column 3 of Table C.6. In Column 3 of Table C.10, we 
simply replicate the Bruce and Mohsin (2006) results. However, our employment measure only 
can date back to 1969. Therefore, Column 3 is a replication using a subset of their data (1969-
1999). Our results are very similar, with some differences being attributed to different time 
period. 
 
 In Column 4, we simply used new control variables (i.e., controls for the business cycle). 
The results are very similar to those in Bruce and Mohsin (2006). In Column 5, we use the Bruce 
and Mohsin (2006) estimation but add updated data. We find some statistical significance that 
was not in Bruce and Mohsin (2006). In Column 6, we examine if the results from our main 
specification are robust to the most recent years (2009-2012). We exclude these years from the 
regression and find the results did not changed. 
 
 To sum up, our results are similar to those in Bruce and Mohsin (2006). However, if we 
had just updated their study with more years, we would have gotten significant results on some 
                                            
15 The difference is that the measure of employment share in Bruce and Mohsin (2006) is obtained by dividing the 
number of individual income tax returns with income from a small business, a farm, a partnership or small business 
corporations. Our measure of employment share is dividing the total number of nonfarm proprietors’’ employment 
by the total national number of nonfarm proprietors’’ employment. 
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of the tax variables, although the magnitudes are very small. This suggests that the more recent 
years of data—from 2000 to 2009—are what drive the importance of using the business cycle. 
 
III. Conclusion  
This paper explores the effect of federal tax policy on entrepreneurship and the heterogeneity of 
it over different phases of the business cycle. It extends the time series literature in several ways. 
First, it examines different effects of tax policy across different phases of the business cycle. 
Second, it uses new measures of entrepreneurship. We use nonfarm proprietor’s income as a 
direct measure of entrepreneurial success. Third, we examine the latest years including the tax 
cuts during the early 2000s. 
 
We start with a series of tests on stationarity and cointegration. The tests suggest 
evidence of both non-stationarity and cointegration. Therefore we use both the OLS and the 
VECM.  These tests also confirm the existence of stable long-run relationships between tax 
policy and measures of entrepreneurship. 
 
The OLS results suggest that federal tax policy does affect entrepreneurial performance, 
but the effects are very small. Most of our results are consistent with earlier literature. But there 
are some interesting results after we take advantage of the VECM to explore long-run 
relationships between tax policies and entrepreneurial performance. For example, the OLS 
results show that an increase in the CIT rate negatively affects entrepreneurial income and 
productivity. Further VECM analysis shows that an increase in the volatility of the CIT rate can 
reduce the volatility of NFPI. 
 
To sum it up, we find that federal tax policies do affect entrepreneurial activity, but the 
effects are very small. The volatility of tax rates does not have much effect on the volatility of 
entrepreneurial success either. Additionally, we do not find such effects vary across different 
stages of the business cycle. Our results suggest that the federal tax policy probably is not the 
best choice to promote entrepreneurial success. There are alternative methods if government 
wants to engineer changes in small businesses. For instance, an increase in government 
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expenditure leads to higher NFPI per capita. Government could increase spending on 
infrastructure to help small businesses performance.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation looks into the effects of tax policy on entrepreneurship at the individual, state 
and the federal levels. The result suggests that tax policy does not have effect on the intensive 
margin of small businesses. At the individual level, most of the behavioral change is caused by 
tax-based misreporting. At the state level, tax policy does not have much effect on 
entrepreneurial performance. At the federal level, tax policy hasstatistically significant but 
economically small effects.  
 
The policy implication of our results is that tax policy is probably not the best choice for 
governments to alter entrepreneurial outcome. Even some pro-entrepreneurship tax policies 
might encourage the entry into small businesses, they do not improve the performance of the 
entrepreneurship. And policy makers and economists probably should be more concerned with 
performance instead of numbers of small businesses. In the end, it is the enduring small and 
innovative firms that create a steady stream of jobs and generate economic spillovers over a 
longer period of time. 
 
Further study could continue to explore the causal relationship between the AMT and 
taxpayers’ behavioral response, if panel data is available. At the state level, spatial factors could 
be considered into the panel dynamic estimation. 
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Appendix A 
 
Note: The solid line represents the kernel density estimate for the tax gap distribution. 
Figure A. 1 Kernel Density of AMT Gap, 1994-2002. 
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Figure A. 2 McCrary Test of Estimated Density of AMT Gap ($0), 1994-2002. 
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Figure A. 3 McCrary Test of Estimated Density of AMT Gap (-$1,200), 1994-2002. 
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Figure A. 4 McCrary Test of Estimating Density of AMT Gap (-$3,600), 1994-2002. 
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Figure A. 5 The AMT Gap by Self-employment Status (Broad Definition). 
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Figure A. 6 The AMT Gap by Self-employment Status (Narrower Definition). 
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Figure A. 7 The AMT Gap by Self-employment Status (The Narrowest Definition). 
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Figure A. 8 The AMT Gap by Self-employment Status (Schedule C). 
  
71 
 
 
Figure A. 9 The AMT Gap by Self-employment Status (Schedule E). 
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Figure A. 10 The AMT Gap by Self-employment Status (Schedule F). 
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Table A. 1 Test for Breaks in the Estimated Density of the AMT Gap, 1994-2002. 
 Test 1 (0) Test 2 (–$1200) Test 3 (–$3600) 
𝜃� 0.104*** –0.048*** –0.167*** 
 (0.106) (0.014) (0.015) 
binsize 500 500 500 
bandwidth 4892.5 6046.0 4751.6 
Notes: *** indicates 1% statistical significance. 
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Table A. 2 Summary Statistics of the Self-Employed and Wage Earners. 
Variable Self-Employed Wage Earners 
Adjusted Gross Income (median) 255,105.3 168,427.9 
AMT Liability (median) 40,813.17 16,377.75 
Regular Tax Liability (median) 41,190 19,190 
Single (=1 if filed as single) 0.14 0.27 
Head of Household (=1 if filed as head of household) 0.02 0.04 
Married Filing Jointly (=1 if filed jointly) 0.81 0.66 
Married Filing Separately(=1 if filed separately) 0.02 0.03 
Total Number of Exemptions 2.72 2.52 
State and Local Tax (median) 9,023.1 2,552.0 
AMT Gap (median) –4,302.8 –2,887.4 
% Pay AMT 0.23 0.27 
Sample Size 100,198 20,290 
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Table A. 3 Regression on Response to AMT Gap (All Self-employed). 
Variable ln(Interest Paid Ratio) ln(Property Tax Ratio) 
ln(Charitable Donation 
Raio) 
AMT Gap 0.00001*** 0.00002*** 0.00001*** 
 (0.000003) (0.000002) (0.000003) 
The Self–employed 0.054* 0.031 0.268*** 
 (0.030) (0.019) (0.029) 
The Self–employed *AMT Gap 0.000005* –0.0000008 –0.000007*** 
 (0.000003) (0.000002) (0.000003) 
AMT Payers –1.417*** –0.902*** –0.865*** 
 (0.050) (0.031) (0.046) 
AMT Payers*AMT Gap –0.00003*** –0.00001*** 0.000004 
 (0.000007) (0.000004) (0.000006) 
The Self-employed*AMT Payers 0.094* 0.180*** –0.006 
 (0.049) (0.031) (0.046) 
The Self-employed*AMT*AMT Gap 0.00002** 0.000003 0.00002*** 
 (0.000007) (0.000004) (0.000006) 
Marginal Tax Rate      –5.387*** –3.725*** –3.468*** 
 (0.079) (0.051) (0.074) 
Total Number of Exemption      0.080*** 0.007* 0.060*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Married and File Jointly –0.062*** 0.048*** 0.116*** 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.016) 
Age 65 and Above –0.694*** 0.117*** 0.597*** 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.014) 
Sample Size       79,594        89,657        91,037 
Notes: *** , **, *indicates 1% , 5% and 10% statistical significance respectively. 
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Table A. 4 Regression on Response to AMT Gap (Schedule C Filers only). 
Variable ln(Business Expense Ratio) 
AMT Gap 0.00002*** 
 (0.000002) 
AMT Payers –0.062 
 (0.056) 
AMT Gap*AMT Payers –0.00002*** 
 (0.000004) 
Marginal Tax Rate –0.875*** 
 (0.163) 
Total Number of Exemption 0.023** 
 (0.010) 
Married and File Jointly –0.145*** 
 (0.038) 
Age 65 and Above –0.064** 
 (0.034) 
Sample Size 23,320 
Notes: *** , **, *indicates 1% , 5% and 10% statistical significance respectively. 
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Table A. 5 Regression on Response to AMT Gap (20% Self-employment Income). 
Variable 
ln(Interests Paid 
Ratio) 
ln(Property Tax 
Ratio) 
ln(Charitable 
Donation Raio) 
AMT Gap 0.00002*** 0.00003*** 0.000007*** 
 (0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000001) 
The Self–employed 0.410*** 0.303*** 0.405*** 
 (0.020) (0.013) (0.019) 
The Self–employed 
*AMT G  
–0.000002 –0.000002 –0.000008*** 
 (0.000002) (0.000001) (0.000002) 
AMT Payers –1.236*** –0.687*** –0.800*** 
 (0.033) (0.021) (0.030) 
AMT Payers*AMT Gap –0.00002*** –0.00001*** 0.00002*** 
 (0.000003) (0.000002) (0.000003) 
The Self-employed*AMT 
P  
–0.130*** –0.101*** –0.1000** 
 (0.037) (0.023) (0.034) 
The Self-
l d*A *A  
 
0.00002*** 0.0000003 0.00001*** 
 (0.000004) (0.000003) (0.000004) 
Marginal Tax Rate –5.253*** –3.662*** –3.387*** 
 (0.079) (0.050) (0.074) 
Total Number of 
i  
0.075*** 0.003 0.054*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Married and File Jointly –0.061*** 0.050*** 0.132*** 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.016) 
Age 65 and Above –0.672*** 0.138*** 0.632*** 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.014) 
Sample Size        79,594         89,657         91,037 
Notes: *** , **, *indicates 1% , 5% and 10% statistical significance respectively. 
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Table A. 6 Regressions on Response to AMT Gap (Interest Paid Ratios). 
Variable Year 1994 Year 1995 Year 1996 Year 1997 Year 1998 Year 1999 Year 2000 Year 2001 Year 2002 
AMT Gap 0.00001 0.00002** 0.000004 0.00002* 0.00002** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** –0.000003 0.00002*** 
 (0.00001) (0.000009) (0.000007) (0.000009) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
The Self–employed 0.029 0.020 0.133 –0.032 –0.077 –0.051 –0.038 0.251*** –0.112 
 (0.121) (0.104) (0.071) (0.106) (0.111) (0.108) (0.095) (0.064) (0.087) 
The Self–employed * 
AMT Gap 0.00001 0.00000 0.00001 0.000001 0.000001 –0.00001 –0.00001 0.00002* –0.0000001 
 (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
AMT Payers –1.547*** –1.237*** –1.257*** –1.415*** –1.220*** –0.928*** –1.220*** –1.465*** –1.791*** 
 (0.206) (0.201) (0.149) (0.209) (0.212) (0.195) (0.166) (0.100) (0.109) 
AMT Payers*AMT Gap –0.00001 –0.0001*** –0.00003 –0.00005 –0.00004 –0.00005* –0.00003 0.000001 –0.00003* 
 (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
The Self-employed* 
AMT Payers 0.327 0.111 0.078 0.139 0.182 0.051 0.097 –0.024 0.179 
 (0.203) (0.196) (0.143) (0.207) (0.208) (0.190) (0.159) (0.104) (0.109) 
The Self-
employed*AMT*AMT 
Gap –0.00001 0.00009** 0.00004 0.00005 0.00004 0.00006* 0.00003 –0.00001 0.00002 
 (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00002) 
Marginal Tax Rate –5.006*** –4.914*** –5.017*** –5.375*** –4.875*** –3.920*** –4.876*** –5.858*** –6.043*** 
 (0.287) (0.282) (0.273) (0.295) (0.303) (0.290) (0.269) (0.159) (0.168) 
Total Number of 
Exemption 0.075*** 0.094*** 0.053*** 0.075*** 0.082*** 0.115*** 0.100*** 0.060*** 0.079*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) 
Married and File Jointly –0.064 –0.131* 0.003 –0.087 0.037 –0.044 –0.117* 0.022 –0.181*** 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.054) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.054) (0.045) (0.046) 
Age 65 and Above –0.771*** –0.731*** –0.617*** –0.891*** –0.744*** –0.696*** –0.678*** –0.568*** –0.648*** 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.054) (0.047) (0.042) (0.042) 
Sample Size 7684 8100 8244 6913 7788 8383 10172 11287 11023 
Notes: *** , **, *indicates 1% , 5% and 10% statistical significance respectively. 
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Appendix B 
 
 Panel 1:  Nonfarm Proprietors’ Income and Employment 
 
Panel 2:  NFPI as a Share of Total Income, NFPE as a Share of Total Employment, and Nonfarm Proprietors’ Productivity. 
Figure B. 1 U.S. Nonfarm Proprietors’ Income, Employment and Productivity.  
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Table B. 1 State Nonfarm Proprietors’ Income. 
 Nonfarm Proprietors’ Income 
State 
Per Capita As a Share of                     
Total Personal Income 
State’s Share of National                
Nonfarm Proprietors’ Income 
1978 2009 1978 2009 1978 2009 
Alabama 1542 2207 0.072 0.066 0.012 0.012 
Alaska 3844 3747 0.094 0.087 0.003 0.003 
Arizona 1903 2275 0.077 0.068 0.010 0.017 
Arkansas 1930 1933 0.091 0.060 0.009 0.006 
California 2933 3515 0.093 0.083 0.139 0.145 
Colorado 2784 3833 0.100 0.092 0.016 0.021 
Connecticut 2231 4796 0.070 0.087 0.014 0.019 
Delaware 1952 2569 0.068 0.064 0.002 0.003 
Florida 1994 2011 0.077 0.052 0.038 0.042 
Georgia 1763 2398 0.077 0.071 0.019 0.026 
Hawaii 1718 2419 0.057 0.058 0.003 0.003 
Idaho 2777 2711 0.116 0.086 0.005 0.005 
Illinois 2260 2718 0.074 0.065 0.053 0.039 
Indiana 1833 1997 0.070 0.059 0.021 0.014 
Iowa 2431 2487 0.088 0.066 0.015 0.008 
Kansas 2525 2666 0.096 0.068 0.012 0.008 
Kentucky 2037 1876 0.092 0.058 0.015 0.009 
Louisiana 1933 2783 0.085 0.074 0.016 0.014 
Maine 2050 2690 0.093 0.074 0.005 0.004 
Maryland 1658 2884 0.055 0.060 0.014 0.018 
Massachusetts 1859 3628 0.067 0.073 0.022 0.027 
Michigan 1637 1918 0.057 0.056 0.031 0.021 
Minnesota 1953 2512 0.071 0.060 0.016 0.015 
Mississippi 1717 2029 0.090 0.067 0.009 0.007 
Missouri 2123 2825 0.084 0.079 0.021 0.019 
Montana 2969 2721 0.118 0.078 0.005 0.003 
Nebraska 2524 2840 0.096 0.072 0.008 0.006 
Nevada 2558 2527 0.080 0.067 0.004 0.007 
New 
 
2022 3564 0.079 0.084 0.004 0.005 
New Jersey 2077 3867 0.067 0.077 0.032 0.038 
New Mexico 1883 1866 0.083 0.056 0.005 0.004 
New York 2373 4184 0.081 0.090 0.087 0.091 
North Carolina 1582 2071 0.072 0.060 0.019 0.022 
North Dakota 2516 2706 0.095 0.066 0.003 0.002 
Ohio 1785 2268 0.065 0.064 0.040 0.029 
Oklahoma 2765 2879 0.115 0.080 0.017 0.012 
Oregon 2612 2525 0.095 0.070 0.014 0.011 
Pennsylvania 2236 2870 0.082 0.071 0.055 0.040 
Rhode Island 1535 2477 0.061 0.060 0.003 0.003 
South Carolina 1387 1791 0.067 0.055 0.009 0.009 
South Dakota 2721 2813 0.113 0.074 0.004 0.003 
Tennessee 2070 3734 0.092 0.109 0.019 0.026 
Texas 2776 4066 0.107 0.105 0.078 0.112 
Utah 2091 2443 0.090 0.077 0.006 0.008 
Vermont 2196 2750 0.096 0.070 0.002 0.002 
Virginia 1728 2344 0.065 0.053 0.019 0.021 
Washington 2459 2961 0.085 0.069 0.020 0.022 
West Virginia 1675 1851 0.076 0.058 0.007 0.004 
Wisconsin 1812 2233 0.067 0.060 0.017 0.014 
Wyoming 3750 3491 0.122 0.072 0.003 0.002 
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Table B. 2 State Nonfarm Proprietors’ Employment and Productivity. 
State 
Nonfarm Proprietors’ 
Employment Share of Total 
Employment 
State’s Share of National 
Nonfarm Proprietors’ 
Employment 
Nonfarm Proprietors’ 
Productivity 
(income/employment) 
1978 2009 1978 2009 1978 2009 
Alabama 0.105 0.195 0.014 0.014 32,911 21,171 
Alaska 0.169 0.209 0.003 0.003 38,713 28,132 
Arizona 0.128 0.215 0.012 0.020 32,439 21,555 
Arkansas 0.137 0.179 0.011 0.008 31,010 20,206 
California 0.131 0.232 0.121 0.130 43,293 28,159 
Colorado 0.152 0.240 0.018 0.021 33,684 25,332 
Connecticut 0.113 0.224 0.014 0.014 37,897 34,253 
Delaware 0.090 0.185 0.002 0.003 42,474 23,130 
Florida 0.146 0.226 0.048 0.063 29,229 16,664 
Georgia 0.110 0.222 0.023 0.033 32,334 19,980 
Hawaii 0.102 0.193 0.004 0.005 29,598 19,443 
Idaho 0.147 0.236 0.005 0.006 37,474 20,121 
Illinois 0.104 0.189 0.047 0.039 42,994 25,433 
Indiana 0.108 0.168 0.022 0.017 34,856 21,647 
Iowa 0.122 0.173 0.014 0.010 38,286 22,021 
Kansas 0.142 0.184 0.014 0.009 33,192 22,515 
Kentucky 0.125 0.167 0.016 0.011 35,773 20,691 
Louisiana 0.109 0.207 0.016 0.015 39,114 23,627 
Maine 0.147 0.226 0.006 0.005 29,261 19,524 
Maryland 0.097 0.211 0.015 0.020 35,611 23,091 
Massachusetts 0.107 0.196 0.025 0.023 33,536 29,622 
Michigan 0.097 0.205 0.032 0.029 37,196 18,518 
Minnesota 0.108 0.184 0.018 0.018 34,057 20,942 
Mississippi 0.112 0.189 0.010 0.008 34,754 21,203 
Missouri 0.120 0.182 0.024 0.018 34,400 26,405 
Montana 0.166 0.239 0.005 0.004 35,924 17,773 
Nebraska 0.135 0.175 0.009 0.006 34,290 23,814 
Nevada 0.111 0.215 0.004 0.009 38,508 20,468 
New 
 
0.133 0.220 0.005 0.005 30,346 26,113 
New Jersey 0.104 0.205 0.028 0.029 42,324 32,915 
New Mexico 0.118 0.191 0.005 0.006 34,898 18,295 
New York 0.109 0.200 0.071 0.062 45,992 37,381 
North Carolina 0.106 0.194 0.024 0.029 29,085 19,101 
North Dakota 0.128 0.167 0.003 0.002 37,061 21,216 
Ohio 0.106 0.182 0.043 0.033 35,032 22,201 
Oklahoma 0.151 0.204 0.017 0.012 37,293 24,289 
Oregon 0.146 0.210 0.015 0.013 34,757 20,846 
Pennsylvania 0.106 0.176 0.046 0.035 45,197 28,886 
Rhode Island 0.102 0.185 0.004 0.003 30,292 24,056 
South Carolina 0.098 0.213 0.011 0.015 29,396 15,597 
South Dakota 0.144 0.189 0.004 0.003 36,660 21,785 
Tennessee 0.118 0.210 0.020 0.021 35,363 31,578 
Texas 0.132 0.225 0.071 0.090 41,126 31,449 
Utah 0.121 0.228 0.006 0.011 36,215 18,230 
Vermont 0.146 0.242 0.003 0.003 29,713 16,913 
Virginia 0.112 0.177 0.024 0.024 30,027 21,960 
Washington 0.130 0.193 0.020 0.021 38,020 26,712 
West Virginia 0.105 0.162 0.006 0.004 39,459 22,922 
Wisconsin 0.112 0.168 0.021 0.016 31,686 21,722 
Wyoming 0.140 0.215 0.003 0.002 46,492 22,767 
82 
 
Table B. 3 Variable Definitions and Means. 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition 1978 2009 
NFPI Nonfarm proprietors’ income ($1,000s) 9,666,381 17,900,000 
NFPI per capita Nonfarm proprietors’ income per capita 2189 2745 
NFPI as a share of total income Nonfarm proprietors’ income as a share of total income in a state (%) 8.36 7.06 
State share of national NFPI Nonfarm proprietors’ income as state share of national NFPI (%) 2 2 
NFPE Nonfarm proprietors’ employment (in thousands) 256,572 708,628 
NFPE as a share of total 
l t 
Nonfarm proprietors’ employment as a share of total employment in a state (%) 12.21 20.05 
State share of national NFPE Nonfarm proprietors’ employment as state share of national NFPE (%) 2 2 
Nonfarm proprietors’ productivity NFPI divided by NFPE ($1,000s) 35784 23247 
Sales tax rate Maximum state sales tax rate (%) 3.54 5.07 
Top PIT rate Maximum personal income tax rate (%) 6.9 5.47 
Top CIT rate Maximum corporate income tax rate (%) 5.95 6.56 
Expenditures per capita State general expenditures per capita ($1,000s) 2.88 5.55 
Sales factor weight Sales factor apportionment (%) 32.3 57.2 
Unemployment rate State unemployment rate (%) 5.62 8.45 
Age > 64 Percent of population aged older than 64 (%) 10.72 13.16 
Crime rate Property crime,  rate per 100,000 inhabitants 4.39 2.94 
Female percentage Female percent of total population (%) 51.02 50.58 
Nonfarm job growth Annual percentage growth in total nonfarm employment (%) 5.72 -4.18 
Agriculture share of GSP Agricultural share of Gross State Product (%) 3.9 1.61 
Manufacturing share of GSP Manufacturing share of Gross State Product (%) 20.91 11.1 
Population density State population density (people per square mile) 153 193 
Amnesty =1  if state has an amnesty 0 0.14 
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Table B. 4 Arellano-Bond Estimates.  
 
 Nonfarm Proprietors’ Income Nonfarm Proprietors’ Employment 
Nonfarm Proprietors’ 
Productivity 
 Per Capita As a Share of Total Income 
State Share of 
National NFPI 
As a Share of Total 
Employment 
State Share of National 
NFPE 
  
Sales tax rate –0.009 0.009 –0.017 –0.019 0.004 –0.052 
 (0.016) (0.042) (0.014) (0.016) (0.024) (0.193) 
Top PIT rate 0.006 0.028 –0.001 0.001 –0.005 –0.030 
 (0.011) (0.029) (0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.138) 
Top CIT rate –0.009 –0.020 0.007 –0.004 –0.003 –0.173 
 (0.019) (0.047) (0.047) (0.012) (0.005) (0.188) 
Expenditures per capita 0.051 0.104 0.044 0.063 0.0004 0.760*** 
 (0.045) (0.077) (0.032) (0.050) (0.016) (0.186) 
Sales factor weight –0.001* –0.001 0.0002 0.001 –0.0002 –0.011** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.005) 
Unemployment rate 0.008 0.086*** 0.002 0.123*** 0.006 –0.130* 
 (0.007) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.005) (0.071) 
Age > 64 0.022 –0.002 0.074 –0.109** 0.010 0.886* 
 (0.037) (0.106) (0.088) (0.054) (0.035) (0.497) 
Amnesty 0.009 0.082 0.014 –0.009 –0.010 0.227 
 (0.023) (0.069) (0.032) (0.018) (0.007) (0.259) 
Amnesty count 0.008 –0.020 0.007 –0.007 –0.011 –0.060 
 (0.014) (0.040) (0.045) (0.024) (0.008) (0.177) 
Crime rate –0.077** –0.072 –0.022 0.039 0.029 –0.402 
 (0.033) (0.070) (0.133) (0.030) (0.020) (0.305) 
Female percentage 0.184** 0.117 –0.367* –0.046 –0.115 0.172 
 (0.084) (0.177) (0.199) (0.070) (0.114) (0.725) 
Agriculture share of GSP 0.013 –0.096*** –0.0001 –0.008 –0.005 0.152** 
 (0.009) (0.030) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.077) 
Manufacturing share of GSP –0.009** –0.025** –0.007 –0.013*** –0.001 –0.045 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.043) 
Nonfarm job growth 0.002* 0.004 0.002** 0.117*** 0.015 –0.202*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) 
Population density 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004** 0.0004 –0.024 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.025) 
L1 0.621*** 0.547*** 0.516*** 0.911*** 0.679*** 0.729*** 
 (0.114) (0.084) (0.134) (0.026) (0.160) (0.054) 
L2 –0.040 –0.038 –0.048 –0.045*** 0.081*** –0.082*** 
 (0.038) (0.032) (0.052) (0.017) (0.016) (0.023) 
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Table B. 5 Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Estimates.  
 Nonfarm Proprietors’ Income Nonfarm Proprietors’ Employment 
Nonfarm Proprietors’ 
Productivity 
 Per Capita As a Share of Total Income State Share of National NFPI Per Capita As a Share of Total Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sales tax rate –0.008 –0.045 0.055 –0.038* –0.00002 0.330** 
 (0.020) (0.049) (0.044) (0.023) (0.010) (0.165) 
Top PIT rate –0.006 0.0003 0.003 –0.008 –0.009** –0.100 
 (0.011) (0.031) (0.012) (0.010) (0.004) (0.135) 
Top CIT rate –0.024 –0.031 0.023 –0.010 –0.0002 –0.314** 
 (0.018) (0.040) (0.016) (0.012) (0.004) (0.153) 
Expenditures per capita 0.049 0.074 –0.089 –0.033* –0.009 0.466 
 (0.035) (0.064) (0.081) (0.018) (0.011) (0.519) 
Sales factor weight 0.00004 0.002 0.002 0.001 –0.0005 –0.006 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.006) 
Unemployment rate 0.007 0.078*** –0.021 0.116*** 0.010 –0.174** 
 (0.007) (0.025) (0.020) (0.015) (0.008) (0.081) 
Age > 64 0.040 –0.059 0.084 0.042* 0.014 0.421 
 (0.035) (0.069) (0.093) (0.024) (0.015) (0.381) 
Amnesty 0.033 0.127 0.038 –0.007 –0.028** 0.282 
 (0.030) (0.083) (0.033) (0.018) (0.012) (0.296) 
Amnesty count –0.025 –0.071 0.023 0.003 0.013 –0.145 
 (0.026) (0.058) (0.042) (0.023) (0.009) (0.236) 
Crime rate –0.051*** –0.103* 0.121*** 0.007 0.026 0.002 
 (0.018) (0.059) (0.042) (0.028) (0.022) (0.259) 
Female percentage –0.038 0.132 –0.230 –0.016 –0.041 0.265 
 (0.083) (0.150) (0.189) (0.068) (0.049) (0.821) 
Agriculture share of GSP 0.014 –0.088*** –0.007 0.012 –0.005 0.107 
 (0.011) (0.027) (0.010) (0.013) (0.004) (0.089) 
Manufacturing share of GSP –0.012** –0.029*** –0.005 –0.017*** –0.001 –0.032 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.047) 
Nonfarm job growth 0.003** 0.004 0.005** 0.122*** 0.020*** –0.219*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.021) 
Population density 0.001** –0.0004 0.001 0.0004* 0.0001 0.010** 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.004) 
L1 0.825*** 0.769*** 0.828*** 1.016*** 0.907*** 0.824*** 
 (0.087) (0.061) (0.081) (0.022) (0.039) (0.052) 
L2 0.001 0.004 0.129** –0.067*** 0.093** –0.062** 
 (0.057) (0.049) (0.070) (0.018) (0.041) (0.028) 
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Table B. 6 Comparison to Bruce and Deskins (2012). 
Employment stock 
Bruce and 
Deskins (2012) Arellano-Bond 
Simple 
Replication 
Simple 
Replication and 
Different 
Controls 
Simple 
Replication and 
Different Time 
Simple 
Replication and 
Arellano-Bond 
Simple 
Replication and 
Different Controls 
and Time 
Sales tax rate –0.015 0.004 0.043 0.019 –0.216*** –0.046 –0.161*** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.066) (0.067) (0.051) (0.100) (0.050) 
Top PIT rate –0.017*** –0.005 –0.015 –0.023 –0.010 0.117*** 0.0004 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.036) (0.016) 
Top CIT rate 0.0002 –0.003 –0.079** –0.086*** –0.062** 0.002 –0.043 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.023) (0.027) 
Expenditures per capita –0.079*** 0.0004 0.051 0.096 0.038 0.003 0.116** 
 (0.031) (0.016) (0.066) (0.068) (0.058) (0.088) (0.055) 
Sales factor weight –0.001* –0.0002 0.003 0.004*** 0.002 0.008** 0.011*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Unemployment rate 0.009* 0.006 0.220*** 0.213*** 0.199*** 0.197*** 0.285*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.030) (0.031) (0.025) (0.050) (0.022) 
Population density 0.002* 0.0004 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.006*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) 
Agriculture share of GSP –0.005 –0.005 0.136*** 0.127*** 0.228*** 0.009 0.209*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.029) (0.030) (0.027) (0.043) (0.028) 
Manufacturing share of GSP 0.005*** –0.001 0.003 0.006 0.004 –0.001 0.0003 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) 
Nonfarm job growth –0.004 0.015 –0.084*** –0.098*** –0.108*** 0.027 0.040*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.020) (0.007) 
Sample Size 700 1450 700 700 1150 700 1500 
Note: *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table B. 7 Arellano-Bond Estimates (Exclude the Great Recession 2008-2009).  
 
 Nonfarm Proprietors’ Income Nonfarm Proprietors’ Employment 
Nonfarm 
Proprietors’ 
  Per Capita As a Share of Total Income 
State Share of National 
NFPI 
As a Share of Total 
Employment 
State Share of National 
NFPE 
  
Sales tax rate –0.031* –0.056 0.000 –0.030 0.014 –0.232 
 (0.014) (0.045) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.193) 
Top PIT rate 0.005 0.018 –0.006 0.004 –0.005 –0.031 
 (0.011) (0.029) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.134) 
Top CIT rate –0.029* –0.068 –0.031 –0.011 –0.005 –0.360* 
 (0.012) (0.040) (0.032) (0.015) (0.007) (0.174) 
Expenditures per capita 0.047 0.117 0.025* 0.059 0.000 0.666** 
 (0.049) (0.062) (0.013) (0.046) (0.015) (0.246) 
Sales factor weight –0.001 –0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 –0.014* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) 
Unemployment rate 0.006 0.078** 0.006 0.115*** 0.008 –0.136* 
 (0.007) (0.026) (0.018) (0.018) (0.005) (0.068) 
Age > 64 –0.013 0.003 0.047 –0.129* 0.006 0.454 
 (0.038) (0.097) (0.083) (0.053) (0.032) (0.515) 
Amnesty –0.017 –0.009 0.007 –0.017 –0.013 –0.084 
 (0.018) (0.046) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.217) 
Amnesty count 0.010 0.001 0.008 –0.003 –0.012 0.025 
 (0.011) (0.033) (0.030) (0.025) (0.008) (0.148) 
Crime rate –0.064* –0.054 –0.016 0.049 0.028 –0.186 
 (0.029) (0.064) (0.130) (0.030) (0.019) (0.268) 
Female percentage 0.189* 0.061 –0.306 –0.037 –0.124 –0.213 
 (0.079) (0.156) (0.182) (0.077) (0.123) (0.719) 
Agriculture share of GSP 0.014 –0.092** 0.000 –0.005 –0.004 0.149* 
 (0.009) (0.029) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.071) 
Manufacturing share of GSP –0.004 –0.020 –0.006 –0.014* –0.001 –0.058 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.042) 
Nonfarm job growth 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.118*** 0.015*** –0.196*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) 
Population density 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 –0.025 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.027) 
L1 0.580*** 0.490*** 0.560*** 0.656*** 0.679*** 0.565*** 
 (0.082) (0.075) (0.026) (0.170) (0.160) (0.061) 
L2 –0.006 0.050 –0.049 –0.066*** 0.081*** –0.101*** 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.440) 
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Table B. 8 Arellano-Bond Estimates (Exclude Alaska and Hawaii).  
 
 
  
 Nonfarm Proprietors’ Income Nonfarm Proprietors’ Employment 
Nonfarm Proprietors’ 
Productivity 
 Per Capita As a Share of Total Income 
State Share of 
National NFPI 
As a Share of Total 
Employment 
State Share of National 
NFPE 
  
Sales tax rate –0.002 0.034 –0.020 –0.025 0.004 –0.057 
 (0.016) (0.041) (0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.197) 
Top PIT rate –0.004 0.000 –0.006 –0.013 –0.006 –0.192 
 (0.008) (0.023) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.112) 
Top CIT rate –0.005 –0.009 0.011 0.009 –0.002 –0.108 
 (0.019) (0.047) (0.047) (0.007) (0.004) (0.175) 
Expenditures per capita 0.009 0.005 0.044 0.100*** 0.000 0.730* 
 (0.035) (0.086) (0.041) (0.030) (0.020) (0.341) 
Sales factor weight –0.001 –0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 –0.010* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) 
Unemployment rate 0.013 0.083*** 0.003 0.109*** 0.006 –0.086 
 (0.007) (0.024) (0.016) (0.013) (0.005) (0.079) 
Age > 64 0.047 0.081 0.084 –0.101 –0.004 1.208* 
 (0.032) (0.110) (0.088) (0.053) (0.031) (0.535) 
Amnesty 0.009 0.080 0.014 –0.006 –0.011 0.187 
 (0.024) (0.067) (0.032) (0.018) (0.008) (0.261) 
Amnesty count 0.011 –0.013 0.011 0.005 –0.009 0.002 
 (0.013) (0.040) (0.044) (0.023) (0.008) (0.179) 
Crime rate –0.120*** –0.122 0.025 0.045 0.026 –0.656* 
 (0.028) (0.065) (0.149) (0.034) (0.018) (0.276) 
Female percentage 0.074 –0.091 0.465* –0.104 –0.149 –0.458 
 (0.091) (0.183) (0.215) (0.066) (0.138) (0.852) 
Agriculture share of GSP 0.002 –0.118*** 0.002 –0.010 –0.005 0.067 
 (0.004) (0.018) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.045) 
Manufacturing share of GSP –0.010* –0.0255* 0.007 –0.016*** –0.001 –0.060 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.043) 
Nonfarm job growth 0.002 0.005 0.002* 0.116*** 0.016*** –0.204*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.020) 
Population density 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.005* 0.000 –0.016 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.025) 
L1 0.682*** 0.495*** 0.508*** 0.903*** 0.691*** 0.732*** 
 (0.123) (0.090) (0.131) (0.026) (0.148) (0.056) 
L2 –0.040 –0.046 –0.051 –0.032*** 0.074*** –0.086*** 
 (0.047) (0.035) (0.054) (0.010) (0.016) (0.026) 
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Table B. 9 Arellano-Bond Estimates (Lagged Control Variables). 
 
  
 Nonfarm Proprietors’ Income Nonfarm Proprietors’ Employment 
Nonfarm Proprietors’ 
Productivity 
 Per Capita As a Share of Total Income 
State Share of 
National NFPI 
As a Share of Total 
Employment 
State Share of National 
NFPE 
  
Sales tax rate –0.040*** –0.045 –0.002 –0.018 –0.026 –0.292* 
 (0.008) (0.032) (0.013) (0.021) (0.016) (0.130) 
Top PIT rate –0.011 0.002 –0.004 –0.023*** 0.009* –0.169 
 (0.006) (0.024) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.088) 
Top CIT rate 0.0001 –0.035 –0.021 –0.003 –0.009 –0.072 
 (0.011) (0.032) (0.034) (0.009) (0.011) (0.181) 
Expenditures per capita 0.046 0.100 0.043 0.048 0.004 0.732*** 
 (0.038) (0.062) (0.030) (0.050) (0.014) (0.129) 
Sales factor weight –0.0003 0.0007 0.0003 –0.0001 –0.0003 –0.0033 
 (0.0006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0056) 
Unemployment rate 0.005 0.088*** 0.0002 0.121*** 0.007 –0.153* 
 (0.008) (0.024) (0.013) (0.017) (0.006) (0.077) 
Age > 64 0.041 0.019 0.076 –0.101* 0.005 0.958* 
 (0.037) (0.096) (0.089) (0.051) (0.033) (0.486) 
Amnesty 0.010 0.086 0.013 –0.012 –0.011 0.240 
 (0.023) (0.070) (0.035) (0.018) (0.008) (0.256) 
Amnesty count 0.011 –0.018 0.011 –0.002 –0.011 –0.061 
 (0.014) (0.041) (0.050) (0.023) (0.009) (0.176) 
Crime rate –0.072* –0.075 –0.019 0.034 0.027 –0.381 
 (0.035) (0.065) (0.135) (0.030) (0.019) (0.295) 
Female percentage 0.167* 0.114 –0.348 –0.064 –0.103 0.176 
 (0.083) (0.158) (0.192) (0.061) (0.108) (0.681) 
Agriculture share of GSP 0.015 –0.090** 0.001 –0.006 –0.004 0.164* 
 (0.010) (0.034) (0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.069) 
Manufacturing share of GSP –0.009* –0.025* –0.007 –0.014** –0.001 0.040 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.045) 
Nonfarm job growth 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.117*** 0.015*** 0.207*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) 
Population density 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.0004 0.024 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.026) 
L1 0.624*** 0.538*** 0.513*** 0.913*** 0.683*** 0.726*** 
 (0.112) (0.085)) (0.138) (0.026) (0.143) (0.053) 
L2 –0.043 –0.038 –0.047 –0.041*** 0.077*** –0.088*** 
 (0.038) (0.032) (0.050) (0.017) (0.016) (0.024) 
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Appendix C 
 
Note: Dashed lines represent troughs of business cycles. 
Figure C. 1 Nonfarm Proprietors’ Income and Employment 1969-2012. 
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Note: Dashed lines represent troughs of business cycles. 
Figure C. 2 NFPI as a Share of Total Income, NFPE as a Share of Total Employment, and Nonfarm Proprietors’ Productivity. 
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Note: Dashed lines represent troughs of business cycles. 
Figure C. 3 Statutory Tax Rates 1969-2012. 
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Table C.1 Data Definitions  
Variable Definition 
Nonfarm proprietors’ income per capita Nonfarm proprietors’ income per capita (in thousands $) 
Nonfarm proprietors’ income share Nonfarm proprietors’ income as a share of total national income (%) 
Nonfarm proprietors’ employment share Nonfarm proprietors’ employment as a share of total national employment 
Nonfarm proprietors’ productivity Nonfarm proprietors’ income divided by employment ($) 
Top personal income tax rate Highest US federal personal income tax rate (%) 
Top corporate income tax rate Highest US federal personal capital gains tax rate (%) 
WS payroll tax rate Statutory US federal payroll tax rate on wage-and-salary income (%) 
Top capital gains tax rate Highest US federal personal capital gains tax rate (%) 
Estate tax exemption Estate tax exemption amount 
Prime rate Prime interest rate 
Government investment expenditure Federal government’s expenditure on investment 
Real GDP growth rate Growth rate of Gross domestic product 
Unemployment rate US Unemployment rate 
Real minimum wage rate Value of the US minimum wage 
Stock of wealth Flow of funds of the US ($billions) 
Age 65 and older Percent of population age 65 and over (%) 
% High school Percent of population age 16 and over who have completed high school 
Work stoppages Number of work stoppages involving 1000 workers or more 
Contraction  Dummy=1 for years in which the economy is in recession 
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Table C.2 Summary Statistics, 1969-2012 
Variables 1969 2012 
Nonfarm proprietors’ income per capita ($) 1,865.06 3,415.08 
Nonfarm proprietors’ income share (%) 8.1 8.3 
Nonfarm proprietors’ employment share (%) 1.1 2.4 
Nonfarm proprietors’ productivity ($) 39,457 27,974 
Top personal income tax rate 77 35 
Top corporate income tax rate 52.8 35 
SE payroll tax rate 9.6 13.3 
Top capital gains tax rate 27.5 15 
Estate tax exemption (in millions $) 0.06 5.12 
Prime rate 7.25 3.25 
Government investment expenditure (in billions $) 179.43 265.44 
Real GDP growth rate 3.04 2.70 
Unemployment rate 3.49 8.08 
Real minimum wage rate 9.35 6.78 
Stock of wealth 65.7 6046.3 
Age 65 and older 17.3 18.48 
% High school 54 
 
87.60 
Work stoppages 412 19 
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Table C.3 Unit Root Tests 
Variables DF-GLS(lag) PP KPSS KPSS(trend) 
   L=1 L=3 L=1 L=3 
A. Levels       
Income per capita –1.827(4) –1.965 2.00 1.04 0.30 0.17 
Income share –1.624(4) –2.254 1.07 0.57 0.33 0.19 
Employment share –1.120(2) 0.197 2.01 1.09 0.39 0.22 
Productivity –1.277(3) –1.904 0.28 0.16 0.28 0.16 
Top personal income tax rate –1.612(1) –1.494 1.82 0.97 0.38 0.21 
Top corporate income tax rate –1.912(1) –1.619 1.96 1.05 0.34 0.20 
Top capital gains tax rate –3.278(3) –2.748 1.45 0.79 0.12 0.07 
Payroll tax rate –0.659(7) 0.198 1.77 0.95 0.54 0.31 
Estate tax exemption –1.652(9) 1.125 1.39 0.81 0.35 0.21 
Prime rate –2.824(1) –2.404 0.77 0.47 0.25 0.17 
Real minimum wage –1.410(1) –2.076 1.63 0.90 0.37 0.23 
Population –0.898(1) –1.434 2.31 1.22 0.53 0.29 
GDP growth rate –3.847(1) –4.799 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.09 
Unemployment rate –2.833(1) –2.560 0.17 0.11 0.18 0.13 
Stock of wealth –1.830(8) –4.639 0.33 0.34 0.03 0.04 
% 65 years old 0.066(1) –0.399 0.60 0.33 0.55 0.30 
% High school –1.979(5) –1.467 2.22 1.17 0.57 0.31 
Work stoppages –1.287(3) –1.792 1.85 1.01 0.50 0.29 
EITC benefits –1.745(4) –2.081 1.95 1.06 0.36 0.21 
       
B. First differences       
Income per capita –1.704(3) –4.753 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.11 
Income share –1.924(3) –4.685 0.21 0.18 0.14 0.12 
Employment share –3.099(1) –6.155 0.71 0.49 0.15 0.13 
Productivity –3.349(2) –4.628 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.11 
Top personal income tax rate –3.742(1) –5.634 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.07 
Top capital income tax rate –4.284(1) –4.298 0.19 0.18 0.06 0.06 
Top capital gains tax rate –4.001(1) –6.207 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.07 
Payroll tax rate –4.162(1) –9.885 0.86 0.82 0.05 0.07 
Estate tax exemption –2.256(8) –4.807 0.61 0.52 0.14 0.15 
Prime rate –4.934(3) –4.288 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.04 
Real minimum wage –4.662(1) –6.114 0.32 0.29 0.04 0.04 
Population –4.068(1) –6.294 0.42 0.39 0.07 0.08 
GDP growth rate –1.510(7) –9.038 0.02 0.40 0.02 0.04 
Unemployment rate –4.609(1) –4.471 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 
Stock of wealth 2.660(7) –7.982 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 
% 65 years old –4.034(1) –6.547 1.55 0.96 0.03 0.04 
% High school –5.333(1) –6.686 1.92 1.11 0.07 0.09 
Work stoppages –1.875(7) –10.172 0.21 0.40 0.02 0.06 
EITC benefits –4.201(1) –6.869 1.95 1.06 0.05 0.06 
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Table C.4 Multiple Cointegration Test Results  
  Nonfarm Proprietors’ 
Income Per Capita 
Nonfarm Proprietors’ 
Income as a share of 
national personal income 
Nonfarm Proprietors’ 
Employment as a share of 
national employment 
Nonfarm Proprietors’ 
Productivity 
A. Trace tests     
Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis     
r = 0 r = 1 134.257 136.867 138.338 124.217* 
r = 1 r = 2 96.156 98.903 97.008 86.685 
r = 2 r = 3 63.318* 65.509* 65.240* 57.686 
r = 3 r = 4 42.211 43.795 40.679 36.752 
r = 4 r = 5 24.121 23.890 22.237 19.649 
r = 5 r = 6 11.542 10.490 9.606 7.414 
r = 6 r = 7 4.088 2.429 1.249 1.408 
      
B. HQIC minimization     
Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis     
r = 0 r = 1 33.242 21.090 16.906 33.242 
r = 1 r = 2 33.157 21.008 16.738 33.157 
r = 2 r = 3 33.071* 20.909* 16.673 33.071* 
r = 3 r = 4 33.134 20.958 16.653* 33.134 
r = 4 r = 5 33.145 20.927 16.653 33.145 
r = 5 r = 6 33.161 20.923 16.666 33.161 
r = 6 r = 7 33.172 20.921 16.656 33.172 
Note: * Indicates significance at the 5% level.
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Table C.5 Bivariate Cointegration Test Results 
  Tax variables 
  PIT CIT Payroll tax Capital tax Estate tax  
Nonfarm proprietors’ income per capita and tax variables 
A. Trace tests 
Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis      
r = 0 r = 1 5.55* 8.78* 12.97* 6.19* 7.70* 
r = 1 r = 2 1.55 1.71 4.34 0.18 0.11 
B. HQIC minimization      
Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis      
r = 0 r = 1 18.65* 16.44* 14.47 18.14* 13.26* 
r = 1 r = 2 18.75 16.70 14.45* 18.19 13.27 
Nonfarm proprietors’ income share and tax variables 
A. Trace tests 
Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis      
r = 0 r = 1 6.54* 9.64* 11.45* 5.13* 6.13* 
r = 1 r = 2 2.35 2.77 5.30 0.58 0.34 
B. HQIC minimization 
Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis      
r = 0 r = 1 6.56* 4.38* 2.35* 6.09* 1.33* 
r = 1 r = 2 6.64 4.40 2.40 6.17 1.38 
Nonfarm proprietors’ employment share and tax variables 
A. Trace tests 
Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis      
r = 0 r = 1 10.41* 8.65* 25.66 13.13* 9.05* 
r = 1 r = 2 2.07 2.71 0.42* 2.81 0.57 
B. HQIC minimization 
Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis      
r = 0 r = 1 2.19 –0.19* –1.95 1.62 –3.12 
r = 1 r = 2 2.18* –0.14 –2.36* 1.56* –3.15* 
Nonfarm proprietors’ productivity and tax variables 
A. Trace tests 
Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis      
r = 0 r = 1 6.87* 7.02* 10.02* 5.36* 6.20* 
r = 1 r = 2 2.21 1.97 2.86 1.25 1.31 
B. HQIC minimization 
Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis      
r = 0 r = 1 9.91* 7.57* 5.77* 9.34* 4.74* 
r = 1 r = 2 9.99 7.64 5.79 9.43 4.81 
Note: * Indicates significance at the 5% level.
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Table C.6 Time Series Multivariate OLS Regression Results, 1969-2012 
Variable Nonfarm proprietors’ 
income per capita 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
income as a share of 
total income 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
employment as a share 
of total employment 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
productivity 
Top personal income tax rate 27.990** 0.071*** –0.007** 0.444*** 
 (11.410) (0.024) (0.003) (0.143) 
Top personal income tax rate * recession –19.770 –0.015 0.00001 –0.186 
 (17.720) (0.038) (0.004) (0.214) 
Top corporate income tax rate –74.570** –0.178*** 0.023*** –1.275*** 
 (29.770) (0.062) (0.008) (0.375) 
Top corporate income tax rate * recession 53.990 0.079 0.001 0.607 
 (45.160) (0.099) (0.008) (0.482) 
SE payroll tax rate –47.200 –0.035 –0.006 –0.604 
 (41.930) (0.083) (0.013) (0.471) 
SE payroll tax rate * recession 53.240 0.042 0.013 0.429 
 (75.530) (0.167) (0.015) (0.759) 
Top capital gains tax rate 1.836 0.015 0.002 0.025 
 (10.610) (0.020) (0.003) (0.153) 
Top capital gains tax rate * recession –6.937 –0.047* 0.006 –0.222 
 (12.060) (0.026) (0.004) (0.156) 
Estate tax exemption –312.000*** –0.569*** 0.068** –3.152** 
 (86.760) (0.195) (0.031) (1.215) 
Estate tax exemption * recession –186.000 –0.809*** 0.082* –3.441* 
 (121.500) (0.271) (0.044) (1.709) 
Prime rate 27.690* 0.038 –0.004 0.148 
 (13.920) (0.032) (0.005) (0.186) 
Prime rate * recession –47.630** –0.147*** 0.008 –0.769*** 
 (19.350) (0.046) (0.008) (0.268) 
Expenditure 3.863** 0.006 –0.0004 0.042* 
 (1.764) (0.004) (0.001) (0.021) 
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Table C.6 Continued 
Variable Nonfarm proprietors’ 
income per capita 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
income as a share of 
total income 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
employment as a share 
of total employment 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
productivity 
Expenditure * recession –2.114 0.006 –0.0004 –0.001 
 (4.068) (0.010) (0.001) (0.055) 
EITC benefit –0.013 –0.0001 0.00002* –0.0006* 
 (0.023) (0.0001) (0.00001) (0.0003) 
Population 0.046** 0.0001* –0.00001 0.0008*** 
 (0.019) (0.00005) (0.00001) (0.0003) 
GDP growth rate 35.490 0.050 –0.001 0.440* 
 (21.620) (0.048) (0.006) (0.246) 
Minimum wage 36.330 0.109 –0.036* 1.316 
 (63.610) (0.140) (0.021) (0.880) 
Stock of wealth 0.020*** 0.00007*** –0.000003 0.0003*** 
 (0.007) (0.00002) (0.000003) (0.00009) 
% 65 years and older –161.600*** –0.311** 0.030 –2.011** 
 (55.980) (0.151) (0.031) (0.959) 
% High school –204.800***       –0.352*** –0.007 –1.691** 
 (45.330) (0.109) (0.019) (0.646) 
Work stoppages 0.530 0.001 0.0001 0.004 
 (0.496) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.007) 
Recession –859.200 –1.487 –0.417 –7.158 
 (1940.400) (4.493) (0.461) (19.340) 
Time trend 124.100 0.048 0.046** –0.436 
 (74.800) (0.175) (0.021) (1.028) 
Constant –237334.600 –89.200 –88.530** 872.700 
 (141676.000) (331.900) (39.290) (1950.500) 
Note: *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table C.7 Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) Results, 1969-2012 
Variable ∆(nonfarm proprietors’ 
income per capitat) 
∆(nonfarm proprietors’ 
income as a share of 
total incomet) 
∆(nonfarm proprietors’ 
employment as a share 
of total employmentt) 
∆(nonfarm proprietors’ 
productivityt) 
Error correction term 1 –0.230* –0.537*** –0.245** –0.010 
 (0.124) (0.144) (0.118) (0.074) 
Error correction term 2 11.371*** 0.034*** –0.004**  
 (5.183) (0.009) (0.002)  
Error correction term 3   0.016***  
   (0.006)  
∆(Income per capitat-1) –0.419***    
 (0.147)    
∆(Income sharet-1)  –0.235   
  (0.178)   
∆(Employment sharet-1)   0.444**  
   (0.184)  
∆(Productivity-1)    –0.439*** 
    (0.158) 
∆(Top personal income tax ratet-1) –3.404 –0.005 –0.001 0.053 
 (4.373) (0.011) (0.001) (0.070) 
∆(Top corporate income tax ratet-1) –17.051 –0.095*** 0.001 –0.275 
 (16.618) (0.038) (0.004) (0.251) 
∆(SE payroll tax ratet-1) –14.199 –0.135 –0.022 0.448 
 (67.334) (0.152) (0.013) (1.259) 
∆(Estate tax exemptiont-1) –50.359 –0.049 0.025 –0.150 
 (95.079) (0.230) (0.020) (1.337) 
∆(Prime ratet-1) 7.849 0.016 0.007*** –0.242 
 (13.581) (0.032) (0.004) (0.178) 
∆(Top capital gains tax ratet-1) 2.220 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (5.063) (0.012) (0.001) (0.088) 
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Table C.7 Continued 
Variable ∆(nonfarm 
proprietors’ income 
per capitat) 
∆(nonfarm 
proprietors’ income as 
a share of total 
incomet) 
∆(nonfarm 
proprietors’ 
employment as a share 
of total employmentt) 
∆(nonfarm proprietors’ 
productivityt) 
Top personal income tax rate * recession –0.293 0.002 –0.001 –0.305 
 (8.822) (0.021) (0.004) (0.218) 
Top corporate income tax rate * recession 10.631 –0.005 0.008 0.197 
 (26.699) (0.063) (0.005) (0.425) 
SE payroll tax rate * recession 43.852 0.097 –0.009 0.540 
 (63.229) (0.152) (0.013) (1.071) 
Top capital gains tax rate * recession –2.630 0.018 0.004 0.195 
 (8.328) (0.019) (0.004) (0.209) 
Estate tax exemption * recession –200.584* –0.561*** 0.053 2.299 
 (109.491) (0.274) (0.046) (2.729) 
Prime rate * recession –40.500 –0.098 0.004 0.081 
 (25.217) (0.061) (0.009) (0.522) 
Expenditure –1.224 –0.007*** –0.001*** –0.007 
 (0.781) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.013) 
Expenditure * recession 1.009 0.005 0.002*** –0.130* 
 (3.740) (0.009) (0.001) (0.075) 
EITC benefit –0.015 0.00005 –0.000003 0.0001 
 (0.022) (0.00005) (0.000004) (0.0004) 
Population 0.000 0.00002 0.00001*** –0.0003 
 (0.015) (0.00004) (0.000003) (0.0002) 
GDP growth rate 40.938*** 0.055* –0.016*** 0.499*** 
 (14.069) (0.033) (0.003) (0.209) 
Minimum wage –7.047 –0.013 –0.025*** 0.607 
 (45.628) (0.096) (0.009) (0.692) 
Stock of wealth 0.009 0.00002 0.000004 –0.0002 
 (0.009) (0.00002) (0.000003) (0.0002) 
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Table C.7 Continued 
Variable ∆(nonfarm 
proprietors’ income 
per capitat) 
∆(nonfarm 
proprietors’ income as 
a share of total 
incomet) 
∆(nonfarm 
proprietors’ 
employment as a share 
of total employmentt) 
∆(nonfarm proprietors’ 
productivityt) 
% 65 years and older –89.741* –0.155 –0.023** –0.263 
 (47.718) (0.110) (0.010) (0.585) 
% High school –64.192 –0.184* –0.016** –0.241 
 (41.903) (0.099) (0.008) (0.592) 
Work stoppages 0.939 0.003 –0.0003** 0.002 
 (0.719) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.009) 
Recession –704.489 –1.747 –0.680 17.683 
 (2243.440) (5.333) (0.438) (37.116) 
Time Trend 65.572 0.135 –0.015 1.173 
 (53.836) (0.133) (0.012) (0.824) 
Constant –124080.200 –257.565 29.319 –2237.215 
 (102754.000) (254.466) (22.206) (1570.020) 
Note: *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table C. 8 Time Series Multivariate OLS Regression Results (Use GDP Growth Rate as an Indicator for the Business Cycle). 
Variable Nonfarm proprietors’ 
income per capita 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
income as a share of 
total income 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
employment as a share 
of total employment 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
productivity 
Top personal income tax rate 9.075 0.038* –0.006** 0.204 
 (7.709) (0.019) (0.003) (0.123) 
Top personal income tax rate * GR 2.757 0.007 –0.0003 0.048 
 (4.080) (0.010) (0.001) (0.054) 
Top corporate income tax rate –43.250 –0.172** 0.028*** –1.027** 
 (31.770) (0.068) (0.008) (0.420) 
Top corporate income tax rate * GR –5.299 –0.006 0.00002 –0.068 
 (8.647) (0.019) (0.002) (0.123) 
SE payroll tax rate –58.960 –0.116 0.018 –0.968 
 (59.200) (0.137) (0.019) (0.809) 
SE payroll tax rate * GR 7.737 0.009 –0.004 0.071 
 (18.050) (0.041) (0.006) (0.284) 
Top capital gains tax rate –12.850 –0.043 0.012** –0.327 
 (16.820) (0.037) (0.005) (0.230) 
Top capital gains tax rate * GR 2.730 0.008 –0.002 0.061 
 (3.730) (0.008) (0.001) (0.055) 
Estate tax exemption –317.200*** –0.780*** 0.106*** –4.033*** 
 (98.420) (0.218) (0.017) (1.081) 
Estate tax exemption * GR 10.040 –0.007 –0.015 0.112 
 (26.820) (0.066) (0.009) (0.452) 
Prime rate –11.270 –0.053 0.010 –0.500 
 (20.370) (0.051) (0.006) (0.302) 
Prime rate * GR 1.775 –0.002 –0.003* 0.058 
 (6.474) (0.015) (0.002) (0.099) 
Expenditure 0.271 –0.005 0.0001 –0.024 
 (1.830) (0.004) (0.001) (0.027) 
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Table C.8 Continued 
Variable Nonfarm 
proprietors’ income 
per capita 
Nonfarm 
proprietors’ income 
as a share of total 
income 
Nonfarm 
proprietors’ 
employment as a 
share of total 
employment 
Nonfarm 
proprietors’ 
productivity 
Expenditure * GR 0.651 0.004*** –0.0001 0.018 
 (0.587) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.012) 
EITC benefit –0.008 –0.00002 0.00002** –0.0004 
 (0.039) (0.0001) (0.00001) (0.0005) 
Population 0.050*** 0.00009*** –0.00001 0.0007*** 
 (0.016) (0.00003) (0.00001) (0.0002) 
GDP growth rate (GR) –198.600 –1.115 0.189 –5.808 
 (481.000) (1.012) (0.123) (6.832) 
Minimum wage 53.150 0.324* –0.035 1.971) 
 (80.500) (0.179) (0.023) (1.310 
Stock of wealth 0.020* 0.00007*** 0.000005* 0.0003** 
 (0.011) (0.00003) (0.000002) (0.0001) 
% 65 years and older –132.500** –0.101 0.026 –1.223 
 (53.780) (0.151) (0.019) (0.752) 
% High school –148.900** –0.195 –0.018 –0.915 
 (67.300) (0.165) (0.015) (0.808) 
Work stoppages 1.149) 0.003 –0.00003 0.013 
 (0.895 (0.002) (0.0002) (0.012) 
Time trend 66.910) 0.032 0.052** –0.689 
 (75.070 (0.152) (0.023) (0.980) 
Constant –128119.100 –55.990 –100.200** 1372.900 
 (141550.300) (285.700) (42.910) (1860.000) 
Note: *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table C. 9 Time Series Multivariate OLS Regression Results (Use Unemployment Rate as an Indicator for the Business Cycle). 
Variable Nonfarm proprietors’ 
income per capita 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
income as a share of 
total income 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
employment as a share 
of total employment 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
productivity 
Top personal income tax rate 108.800* 0.261* –0.002 1.103 
 (56.500) (0.149) (0.013) (0.655) 
Top personal income tax rate * UR –13.400* –0.031 0.000 –0.133 
 (7.717) (0.020) (0.002) (0.090) 
Top corporate income tax rate –250.600*** –0.552** 0.0003 –2.340** 
 (93.130) (0.253) (0.026) (1.100) 
Top corporate income tax rate * UR 34.240*** 0.073** 0.0005 0.323** 
 (12.230) (0.032) (0.003) (0.144) 
SE payroll tax rate 13.800 –0.110 –0.062 0.729 
 (108.200) (0.306) (0.046) (1.808) 
SE payroll tax rate * UR –0.640 0.021 0.007 –0.085 
 (16.520) (0.046) (0.007) (0.234) 
Top capital gains tax rate –17.750 –0.018 –0.004 0.046 
 (30.740) (0.074) (0.008) (0.405) 
Top capital gains tax rate * UR 3.387 0.003 0.001 –0.003 
 (5.355) (0.013) (0.002) (0.068) 
Estate tax exemption –686.000 –2.111* 0.215** –10.270** 
 (405.100) (1.098) (0.104) (4.141) 
Estate tax exemption * UR 82.410* 0.253** –0.021** 1.220*** 
 (41.670) (0.115) (0.010) (0.441) 
Prime rate –31.710 –0.129 0.025 –0.601 
 (67.830) (0.182) (0.016) (0.840) 
Prime rate * UR 0.432 0.003 –0.003* 0.005 
 (7.891) (0.023) (0.002) (0.100) 
Expenditure 16.030* 0.055** 0.001 0.161 
 (7.890) (0.022) (0.002) (0.107) 
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Table C.9 Continued 
Variable Nonfarm proprietors’ 
income per capita 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
income as a share of 
total income 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
employment as a share 
of total employment 
Nonfarm proprietors’ 
productivity 
Expenditure * UR –2.205* –0.008*** –0.00002 –0.026 
 (1.058) (0.003) (0.0004) (0.016) 
EITC benefit 0.026 0.0001 –0.00003** 0.001 
 (0.038) (0.0001) (0.00001) (0.001) 
Population 0.056*** 0.0001*** –0.000006 0.0008*** 
 (0.020) (0.00004) (0.000004) (0.0003) 
Unemployment Rate (UR) –551.600 –0.668 –0.068 –2.931 
 (431.900) (1.232) (0.187) (5.267) 
Minimum wage –12.820 0.095 0.011 0.171 
 (78.290) (0.204) (0.025) (1.152) 
Stock of wealth 0.028*** 0.00008*** –0.000001 0.0003*** 
 (0.009) (0.00002) (0.000002) (0.0001) 
% 65 years and older –117.400* –0.186 0.029 –1.337 
 (59.010) (0.139) (0.021) (0.785) 
% High school –103.600 –0.128 0.004 –0.922 
 (97.310) (0.220) (0.020) (1.187) 
Work stoppages –0.033 –0.0003 –0.00004 –0.003 
 (0.468) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.006) 
Time trend –7.621 –0.161 0.039* –1.402 
 (119.400) (0.248) (0.022) (1.422) 
Constant 16168.900 310.400 –75.300* 2724.200 
 (227578.200) (474.500) (42.030) (2707.900) 
Note: *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table C. 10 Comparison to Bruce and Mohsin (2006). 
Employment stock 
Bruce and Mohsin 
(2006) 
Our Results using 
Different Controls 
and Time 
Simple 
Replication16 
Simple Replication 
and Different 
Controls 
Simple Replication 
and Different Time 
Our Results 
excluding the Great 
Recession 
Top PIT rate 0.003 –0.007*** –0.002** –0.004 –0.002 –0.008** 
 (0.014) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Top capital gains tax rate –0.091** 0.002 –0.0002 –0.0003 0.004** 0.002 
 (0.020) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Top corporate income tax rate –0.005 0.023*** 0.0004 0.006 0.008 0.024*** 
 (0.033) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
SE payroll rate –0.103 –0.006 –0.005 0.0006 –0.017* –0.026 
 (0.138) (0.013) (0.008) (0.029) (0.009) (0.041) 
Estate tax17 –0.224 0.068* 0.041*** 0.115 0.049*** 0.116 
 (0.492) (0.031) (0.010) (0.395) (0.013) (0.079) 
Real minimum wage –1.233 –0.036* –0.004 –0.0008 –0.020* –0.031 
 (0.207) (0.021) (0.011) (0.027) (0.011) (0.030) 
Real GDP growth rate 0.054 –0.001 –0.004* –0.007 0.001 –0.0003 
 (0.028) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) 
Stock of wealth18 –0.138 –0.00003 –0.00004 –0.00002 –0.000016 –0.00004 
 (0.065) (0.00003) (0.00007) (0.000009) (0.000015) (0.00003) 
Work Stoppages –0.002 0.0001 –0.00006 –0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.0002) (0.00008) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
% High school –0.393 –0.007 –0.014* –0.0008 –0.030** 0.0002 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.023) 
Sample Size 50 44 31 44 44 41 
                                            
16 Since our measure of entrepreneurial employment only goes back to 1969, the simple replication includes years from 1969 to 1999. Bruce and Mohsin (2006) 
used years from 1949 to 1999. 
17 Bruce and Mohsin (2006) used estate tax exclusion; we used estate tax exemption. 
18 The scale of our measure is different from that in Bruce and Mohsin (2006). 
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